This article is a Focus Area self-published piece, and the content has not undergone standard editorial review. IWI hosts these pieces to facilitate rapid dialogue among practitioners, but the analysis, research, and original thought within the article remain the sole responsibility of the author.
The United States military is in the middle of a hard pivot to focus on the Western Hemisphere, as codified by the recent publication of the 2026 National Defense Strategy, which identified securing U.S. interests “from the Arctic to South America” as critical to its lines of effort. The capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in Operation Absolute Resolve was confirmation that the United States military will become more involved in South America. And if further evidence were needed, in January 2026, the Army redesignated the 1st Security Forces Assistance Brigade as the Army Security Cooperation Group – South, and it will take over the Combined Jungle Operations Training Course in Panama.
This increasing focus on operations in the Western Hemisphere will require closer integration with allies and partners in the region – as well as a better understanding of the region’s geography and how it shapes those allies and partners. This analysis will focus on the Peruvian military’s riverine operations, their importance, and their unique contributions to Amazonian military operations.
Combat and Training in Riverine Environments
Increased partnerships and joint training operations with Latin American militaries are not a one-way street. The U.S. military will not just teach regional partners how to operate more effectively, but U.S. troops can also learn, or rather re-learn, a lost art: jungle warfare and its sub-component, riverine operations. Training in this unique and harsh environment is already underway: US Marines with 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion carried out a jungle operations training course with Panamanian security forces at Aeronaval Base Cristóbal Colón in February. “The challenging, 18-day course prepares the forces to work together during operations in the demanding, dense, triple-canopy jungle terrain,” the Command explained.
The same month, US Southern Command donated light weapons and other equipment to Paraguay’s joint special forces battalion; the transfer ceremony also marked the start of a six-month training course for the battalion conducted by the U.S. military’s 7th Special Forces Group and Special Operations Command South. Given Paraguay’s geography and internal security challenges – primarily in the “Triple Frontera” or tri-border area, this training course will likely also focus on jungle operations.
Given this context, the Peruvian military is an ideal partner for U.S. troops to work together and relearn jungle warfare and riverine operations. All three branches of the Peruvian armed forces operate across the Amazon, and their role there is critical to protecting national sovereignty and combating crimes across the rainforest. Moreover, the Peruvian military has two centuries of experience operating in the Amazon rainforest, including over a century of riverine operations. As the U.S. military turns toward the Western Hemisphere, specifically counter-narcotics operations, U.S. troops would benefit significantly from this knowledge and experience to re-learn the art of jungle warfare and its subcomponent, riverine operations.
Combat and Training in Riverine Environments
The Peruvian armed forces — Army (Ejército del Perú: EP), Air Force (Fuerza Aérea del Perú: FAP), Navy (Marina de Guerra del Perú: MGP) — are no strangers to suffering attacks against their troops and Amazonian platforms, from helicopters to riverine vessels. This situation was prevalent during the most violent periods of the internal conflict in the 1980s and 1990s, but more recent incidents have occurred as well. For example, in 2018, the riverine patrol vessel BAP Río Nanay was traveling through the Putumayo River when they were shot at with light-caliber weaponry from the Colombian side of the border. Three MGP personnel were injured in that incident.
When the Peruvian military’s riverine vessels were attacked, the fire came from the riverbanks. In the future, danger could also come from above. Criminal and terrorist networks across Latin America have eagerly adopted uncrewed aerial systems (UASs), popularly known as drones over the past several years. In countries like Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, drones (commercial or locally made) are used to transport grenades and other explosives to attack rival groups, military and police personnel, or cause harm and terror among the local population.
In mid-February, ELN insurgents used lethal drones to attack a Colombian military base in Arauca department. Moreover, there are reported cases of drones being used to attack riverine vessels. In late 2024, video footage was released of a Colombian Navy riverine patrol vessel traveling along the Naya River. The video shows troops aboard the boat shooting at the sky, as there were three drones carrying explosives operated by FARC dissidents, namely the Jaime Martínez Bloc. The video footage does not show counter-UAS systems aboard the Colombian Navy’s riverine vessel. Other similar incidents occurred in 2025. There are no reports of drone attacks against the MGP’s vessels; however, this could occur in the near future, particularly along the Amazon and Putumayo rivers, given their proximity to the Colombian border.
Peru’s riverine fleet has also been involved in inter-state warfare. The Amazon was the primary area of operations for a war between Peru and Colombia in 1932-1933 and three short-lived wars with neighboring Ecuador in 1941, 1981, and 1995. According to the Peruvian Institute of Historical Maritime Studies (Instituto de Estudios Histórico-Marítimos del Perú: IEHMP), the gunboat Marañón had an “efficient” role in “defending national sovereignty during the armed conflicts” of 1981 and 1995.
It is natural that training in riverine operations is also part of the Peruvian Navy’s standard curriculum. Case in point: recently, second-year cadets from the MGP’s officer academy in Lima traveled to Iquitos to continue their training and education in riverine operations. Specifically, the cadets will travel aboard the riverine hospital ships BAP Ucayali II and BAP Morona to increase their training “in the strategic theater which is the Peruvian Amazon,” the Navy explained in a late January statement.
Similarly, Peruvian Navy riverine assets annually train with troops and riverine vessels from neighboring Brazil and Colombia. Their BRACOLPER exercise is arguably the oldest multinational riverine exercise in the world.
The Need to Update the Riverine Fleet
In Peru, combat riverine craft fall under the command of the Navy’s General Command for Amazonian Operations (Comandancia General de Operaciones de la Amazonía: COMOPERAMA) in Iquitos, the location of the MGP’s Fifth Naval Zona (Quinta Zona Naval). COMOPERAMA is one of the Navy’s four commands; the other three are the Pacific Operations Command, DICAPI, and Cyberdefence Command.
The Peruvian Navy operates a fleet of different types of riverine platforms across the country’s vast network of rivers. The MGP’s riverine fleet includes the Marañon-class and Clavero-class gunboats, a fleet of small patrol vessels, light-weight Griffon 2000 hovercraft, small speedboats, and hospital ships. The gunboats BAP Marañón (CF-13) and BAP Ucayali (CF-14) are over 60 years old, while gunboats BAP Clavero (CF-15) and BAP Castilla (CF-16) are much newer, produced within the last two decades. Meanwhile, the Peruvian Army operates a small number of riverine logistical support boats (locally called motochatas) that transport supplies and fuel.
Modernizing and strengthening the Peruvian military’s riverine fleet does not involve solely replacing old vessels and increasing the fleet’s size, but also acquiring modern technologies to be used on board to protect the crew. Given the incidents in neighboring Colombia, the Peruvian Ministry of Defense and armed forces must invest in counter-UAS systems that can be installed aboard riverine vessels to protect the crew and boat from potential aerial drone attacks in the future.
Made-In-Peru Riverine Vessels
It is essential to discuss Peruvian politics and the manufacturers of MGP’s riverine fleet to understand current and future capabilities and the modernization process. The hovercraft were acquired from the United Kingdom, but a significant portion of the fleet was domestically produced by the Peruvian state-run shipyard Servicios Industriales de la Marina (SIMA). SIMA has three shipbuilding facilities: two on the coast, in Callao and Chimbote, and one in the city of Iquitos, in the Loreto region, Peru’s major city in the Amazon.
Generally speaking, South American shipyards are undergoing a golden age, with modern, advanced platforms being manufactured for Oceanic operation. As for riverine platforms, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru also manufacture them domestically. SIMA Iquitos, the Amazonian facilities of the Peruvian shipyard, has manufactured patrol vessels, the motochatas, and a fleet of boats that provide health and state services (locally called Plataformas Itinerantes de Acción Social: PIAS). Recent projects by COMOPERAMA have focused on repairing and modernizing helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. So far, it is unclear if the oldest gunboats, BAP Marañón and BAP Ucayali, which are still operational, will be retired and replaced by newer platforms.
The future of the Peruvian military’s riverine fleet will begin and end at home, given the current trend toward domestic vessel manufacturing. This reality provides an opportunity to take a substantial leap forward: the shipyard SIMA is partnering with an international partner (South Korea’s Heavy Hyundai Industries) to produce more technologically advanced ships, namely a frigate and an oceanic patrol vessel; a similar partnership with an international shipyard must be achieved to manufacture more advanced riverine vessels in the coming years. Having an efficient, constantly busy shipyard in Iquitos allows for the military’s fleet of riverine ships to be quickly and professionally repaired and upgraded, and for new platforms to be manufactured in the future as well.
The Potential for US-Peru Military Riverine Exercises
Over the last several months, the U.S. military has launched an unprecedented militarization of counter-narcotics operations in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific – and in the process, pulling a massive naval flotilla, as well as Marines and Air Force aircraft. On 13 November, Secretary Hegseth announced Operation Southern Spear, and since then the U.S. military has launched dozens of air strikes against vessels suspected of transporting drugs across the Caribbean Sea and the Eastern Pacific. The most recent operation took place on 5 May. In addition to Operation Southern Spear and Operation Absolute Resolve, the Pentagon has created a new counter-narcotics task force, part of the II Marine Expeditionary Force, though it is unclear how this task force will operate alongside Joint Interagency Task Force South, which is already tasked with counter-narcotics. If the U.S. military continues to stay involved in regional counter-narcotics operations, it will be forced to work closely with partners like the Peruvian and Colombian militaries and police.
Additionally, if the U.S. military is going to continue its increased presence in Latin America to combat drug trafficking, or conduct ground operations in Venezuela or elsewhere in the region, it may have to re-learn the arts of jungle warfare and riverine warfare, given that narco-labs and coca fields are located in isolated areas deep in the Amazonian rainforest. However, the U.S. military has not had to engage in jungle warfare operations since the Vietnam War. Similarly, riverine operations are a capability that the United States military has lost since the Vietnam War, the heyday of the U.S. military’s “Brown Water Navy.”
Increased exercises and bilateral training with U.S. partners in the region would be one of the fastest and most effective ways to regain lost U.S. expertise. South American militaries already conduct annual exercises; for example, in 2021, for the first time, the multinational exercise UNITAS included a jungle component, as troops (including U.S. troops) trained in the Peruvian Amazon as Peru hosted UNITAS that year. U.S. military units have also recently trained with the Brazilian Army, the Surinamese Defense Force, and Panama’s security agencies in jungle environments. The increased U.S. military presence in Panama means that jungle warfare training will become more common. However, if the U.S. military wants to re-learn the art of jungle warfare and riverine operations, the Peruvian military is an ideal partner.
This author recently proposed in a co-authored commentary for the Americas Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies the establishment of the multinational exercise Jungle Thunder. The objective of the exercise is for U.S. troops to train in jungle warfare, including riverine operations, in the Amazon. The armed forces of Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, the focus of the study, would certainly support this opportunity, as a preamble to establishing Jungle Thunder. Perhaps, as a prelude to establishing Jungle Thunder, U.S. troops could be invited to participate in exercise BRACOLPER.
Conclusions: Training with the Combat-Proven Experts
The Peruvian military has a long history of riverine operations. Within the first few decades of independence, the Peruvian government began acquiring riverine craft: Peru gained independence in 1821, and by 1864, the first four riverine craft arrived —Morona, Pastaza, Napo, and Putumayo —followed by América in 1905. Moreover, in the last century, Peru fought four interstate wars against two neighboring states, and the Amazon was the primary theater of operations for all of them. Peru fought three conflicts against Ecuador and one against Colombia; additionally, during the 1980s and 1990s, Peru fought a bloody internal counterinsurgency campaign against two terrorist movements: Sendero Luminoso (SL, or Shining Path) and the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA, or Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement). These internal conflicts involved urban warfare (across cities and towns), mountain warfare (in the Andes), and jungle warfare (across the Amazon) – forcing the Peruvian military to build competency across all three terrain types and in riverine warfare.
Today, the Peruvian armed forces continue to operate daily across the Amazon rainforest, including across the vast network of rivers in the country to combat counter-narcotics, and combating narco-insurgent movements (namely the remnants of Shining Path), smuggling, human trafficking, and also tackling environmental crimes like illegal logging, illegal mining, wildlife trafficking, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Border patrols also require riverine missions (e.g., the natural border between Peru and Colombia is the Putumayo River).
Riverine operations are a core component of the Peruvian armed force’s jungle warfare operations, which, in turn, is a vital pillar of its military history and current theater of operations. There is much the U.S. military can learn from its Peruvian counterparts on jungle and riverine operations, a niche type of warfare, especially as the U.S. military turns toward counter narcotics in the region and will need to work closely with its allies and partners in South America.
Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international defense, security, and geopolitical issues across the Western Hemisphere, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. He is the President of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, DC, and a non-resident Senior Associate at the Americas Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS). Follow him on X/Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author.
Main image:The US Coat Guard and the Peruvian Coast Guard conduct joint riverine operations training during Resolute Sentinel 2024. Taken from DVIDS.
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
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This article is a Focus Area self-published piece, and the content has not undergone standard editorial review. IWI hosts these pieces to facilitate rapid dialogue among practitioners, but the analysis, research, and original thought within the article remain the sole responsibility of the author.
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