In a recent wargame designed to simulate a major invasion in the Indo-Pacific region, organizers deliberately removed the civilian population from the battlefield. This surprising decision was made to focus exclusively on large-scale combat operations (LSCO), allowing for a direct, seemingly unobstructed contest between the American-made M1 Abrams against Chinese Type 99 main battle tanks. Emphasizing straightforward, physical engagements, this type of scenario is where the Department of Defense has traditionally excelled in modeling.
However, the reality of warfare quickly complicated the simulated environment. Despite the American commander’s efforts to isolate the battlefield, external influences through a third-party country challenged the exercise’s narrow scope. This revealed a significant limitation: the multidimensional nature of actual combat defies the simplifications of traditional wargames. The Department of Defense often relies on these types of one-dimensional approaches in wargaming, focusing predominantly on the physical aspects of warfare. This perspective has led to significant strategic missteps in the last two decades, as demonstrated by the flawed outcomes in America’s post-9/11 wars.
To address this shortcoming, the Department of Defense must evolve its approach by integrating human and information dimensions into its modeling processes. This change will improve planning and resource allocation and ensure that US forces are better prepared for future conflicts.
The Department of Defense primarily models hardware rather than human factors, but this approach often results in major missteps. For instance, in August 2021, analysts predicted the Afghan government would fight for at least six months after the US withdrawal. Similarly, in February 2022, western predictions underestimated Kyiv’s resilience, expecting it to fall within six days. Both projections were spectacularly wrong.
Part of the problem lies in how the US military models combat. The process often simplifies and distorts irregular warfare capabilities. Conducted by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA), this modeling tries to quantify the effects of human and informational dimensions into tangible, physical terms. For example, an extensive resistance force or an effective information operation might be represented as a simple increase in the effectiveness of friendly forces, such as making tank rounds 16% more effective.
While such simplifications can be appropriate for specific scenarios, such as a psychological operation helping to take tanks off the battlefield, they often fail to capture the nuanced impact of significant events. The defiant stance of Volodymyr Zelenskyy with his cabinet, the resolve of border guards at Snake Island, or the symbolic strength of “I need ammunition, not a ride” do not readily translate into numerical modifiers like a +1 artillery strength. These elements have been central to the war in Ukraine, yet they resist reduction to solely the physical dimension.
How The Other Dimensions Are Different
The limitations of the current one-dimensional approach have not gone unnoticed. Critics, including Marine Lieutenant Colonel Paul Bailey, are pressing the Department of Defense to broaden its perspective by integrating human and information domains more thoroughly into Pentagon modeling. Reflecting on the failures in Afghanistan, Bailey argues that “[t]o better enable future success, the military needs to apply analysis-based political warfare frameworks.” He points out that the United States’ inadequate grasp of the human dimension directly contributed to the humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan. “Rather than waging a political warfare campaign, the U.S. military basically approached Afghanistan through traditional battlefield combat,” Bailey notes, highlighting a default to “unilateral combat operations that often failed to distinguish between the Taliban, Haqqani network, al Qaeda, local warlords, or militias.”
Admittedly, modeling human and information dimensions is challenging. However, completely ignoring or trying to compress these aspects into the physical dimension distracts from their unique characteristics. Recognizing the distinctiveness that led to their inclusion in military doctrine is crucial. In other words, each military domain – air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace – has physical, human, and information dimensions that warrant thorough exploration.
Take, for instance, the Ayungin Shoal in the South China Sea. This site illustrates the complexity of these dimensions: the physical dimension is significantly shaped by the maritime domain, which features competing territorial claims. But there is also a human dimension, with fleets of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, not to mention the sailors on the BRP Sierra Madre. The information dimension also comes into play, as the US supports the Philippines by publicizing the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) illegal activities in the region. To effectively analyze the ongoing dispute between the Philippines and the PRC, modelers, simulators, and wargamers must examine all three dimensions for comprehensive insights.
The Human Dimension: Antifragile
Early in the nuclear age, debates raged about the value of counterforce versus counter-value targeting. The theory was that physical destruction could compel a population to pressure their government to surrender. This was the underlying theory behind earlier strategic bombing campaigns, an attempt to reduce the human dimension into the physical. And it did not work.
In Bombing to Win, Robert Pape demonstrated that attacks on the civilian populace hardly ever induce the desired result. Similarly, Thomas Griffin found that these attacks “…could prove counterproductive to the political aims of the war.” Gavin Wilde, examining how cyber-attacks were failing to induce the predicted results, noted that “the bombardment of one’s adversaries—be they British, German, Japanese, Vietnamese, or Iraqi—typically prompted more anger than fear, sparking a rally-round-the-flag effect for the besieged populace.” Can a loitering munition take out a power control station? Yes. Can a cyber team attack it via the cyber domain and physically damage it? Possibly. Our current physical models can easily simulate both. But what is the impact on the human dimension?
Nasim Taleb’s concept of Antifragility describes systems that improve under stress – unlike traditional military hardware like M1 Abrams tanks, which are merely resilient. Humans, in contrast, can become antifragile, thriving under certain kinds of stress and chaos. Taleb explains that humans generally respond better to acute stressors than to chronic ones, especially when these acute stressors are followed by sufficient recovery time, allowing these challenges to serve as catalysts for growth and adaptation. This distinction underscores the necessity of incorporating human factors in military models. While a physical model might predict a straightforward victory for the US Army of Saddam’s forces in the Iraq War, a model that accounts for the human dimension would expose the subsequent power vacuum and the emboldening of Iran, illustrating the unpleasant consequences of warfare that go beyond mere battlefield success.
The Information Dimension: Virality
Similarly, the information dimension operates under unique rules akin to viral pathology. Ideas spread and mutate within populations, influenced by the latest digital and AI tools, which amplify their reach. The information dimension, however, is not solely the realm of psychological operations. A Carrier Task Group, often viewed as a symbol of “hard power,” can wield substantial influence in the information sphere. For instance, following a devastating typhoon, a Carrier Task Group off the coast of the Philippines can profoundly demonstrate US “soft power,” offering essential aid and thus positively influencing perceptions.
The rise of advanced technologies, such as large language models and machine learning, is reshaping conflict at an unprecedented scale. Innovations like deepfake videos designed to discredit opponents, AI-driven Chatbots that foment unrest inside online communities, and social media scrapping tools that analyze sentiment are poised to transform the information dimension. As costs decrease and capabilities expand, the impact of these tools grows exponentially.
Yet the essence of the information dimension lies not in the volume of data or messages but in their ability to find susceptible hosts. Ideas, like viruses, must find receptive minds to infect and multiply, once again underscoring the necessity of including human factors in military modeling and wargaming. This approach allows analysts to identify key influencers and nodes where information operations could have disproportionate effects.
Integrating Human and Information Dimensions for Effective Modeling
All models have limitations, but as G. E. P. Box famously said, “some are useful.” The challenge lies in improving military models to more accurately mirror the complexities of modern warfare. The Pentagon has already seen some successes in this area through its operations in the Philippines and Colombia, which successfully incorporated human and information factors.
Looking ahead, one of the most pressing questions facing the US military is how well Taiwan might resist a Chinese invasion. Current models may not accurately predict this scenario due to their focus on the purely physical dimension. The war in Ukraine further exposes the shortcomings of traditional models in urban combat, where physical, human, and information factors are intertwined.
To better prepare for future challenges, the Pentagon needs to create models that embrace all three dimensions. The office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense – Special Operations Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD-SOLIC) and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) are well positioned to support this evolution. SOCOM’s new Joint Military Analysis (JMA) process, along with forthcoming updates in FM 3-05 (Army Special Operations Forces) and contributions from the Irregular Warfare Center at NDU, can help provide insights and methodologies to further refine military modeling. This collaborative effort improves planning and resource allocation and ensures that US forces remain effective in the face of evolving global threats. Ultimately, embracing a three-dimensional approach will better prepare the US military for future conflicts, ensuring it does not underestimate its adversaries or the environments in which it operates.
Lt. Col. Erik Davis is an active-duty Army officer with over 16 years of experience in special operations. He is also a Gen. Wayne A. Downing Scholar with master’s degrees from King’s College London and the London School of Economics. His assignments have taken him from village stability operations in rural villages in Afghanistan to preparing for high-end conflict in the First Island Chain. He was a 2023 Irregular Warfare Initiative Fellow.
Main Image: Students from Air War College participate in a war-game designed around Pacific conflict, December 21, 2023. (Billy Blankenship via DVIDS)
Views expressed in this article solely reflect those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
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Robbie Dressler says
The JMA recommendation is very interesting and timely. Where is more information available on that?
Martell Wilkins says
Interesting points. The point I find most critical is the Human Dimension as well. So much so that I see this point as the most susceptible to subjective change, perpetually creating lucid and dynamic strategic goals, taxing on all resources. To fully understand the human dimension of a target, nation, or group, their history is often referred to for more insight when creating tactics and then practically ignored on the strategic level.
If we look at Afghanistan and Ukraine, we can find uniquely resilient demographics: I can argue the outcomes were plain as day only to those who understand what those people want for their country and who they rely on. Afghanistan has been known as the graveyard of empires since its Western discovery; Ukrainians have maintained their unique identity through many power vacuums. The US’ strategic approach to both these countries is objective to US policy. Until the US policy is aligned subjectively to the objective needs of an ally or nation of interest, the strategic goals through involvement will always fall short of the many tactical advantages and gains experienced. That said, I believe the analysts running wargames need to factor in the collective historical makeup of the human capital involved in the conflict to create a solid representation of their unique capacity to resist, endure, subjugate, defend, and offend. It is wargaming, so we must play a wargame like Dungeons and Dragons.
WW2 had an effective strategic outcome because the strategy changed when the enemies stopped fighting. In a 5GW world, the “will to fight,” is a capacity within everyone with the skillset to “fight” digitally or physically.
Thanks for your contribution.