Despite decades of demonstrated failure of military operations to achieve Israeli security, Israel continues to prioritize use of its military in its conflict with the Palestinians rather than pursue political processes—such as negotiations, mediation, conciliation, or concessions—that have a chance to achieve peace.
The Palestinians’ lack of self-determination has been the casus belli of this conflict. While some on the Palestinian side such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) would likely never accept a negotiated peace, they would be isolated and lacking the broader Palestinian community’s acquiescence in the event of a demonstrable and durable peace that recognized Palestinian rights and security, along with those of Israelis.
In the past twenty years, Israeli leaders have consistently avoided meaningful negotiations, arguing falsely that there is no Palestinian partner for peace, restricting the Palestinian National Authority’s (PNA) activities in the West Bank, conflating Hamas and PIJ violence with rejection by all Palestinians, and persistently punishing Palestinian civilians, in highly disproportionate attacks, for acts of terrorism committed by Islamist or nationalist extremists. This has been an ineffectual formula that promoted rather than prevented future violence.
If Israel is to secure its southern population—particularly given its demonstrated intelligence and military failures on October 7—it needs to destroy more than Hamas’ governance, military infrastructure, and leadership. These will likely begin to re-emerge in a matter of months. It would need to destroy the need for Hamas, and this is a political, not a military, challenge. A variant on the formula of the failed Oslo process that results in the separation of Israelis from Palestinians and self-determination and economic freedom for Palestinians—freedoms Israelis already enjoy—would be needed if there is any chance of a lasting diminution of the violence and potential end to the conflict.
Gaza since 2005
The political and security configuration of the Gaza Strip on October 6, 2023—the day before Hamas’ brutal terrorist attack in southern Israel and Jerusalem’s subsequent retaliatory war—dates back to two events nearly twenty years old. First, in 2005, the government of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon conducted Operation Shevet Ahim, withdrawing settlers and ground forces from the Gaza Strip. Israel maintained full control over Palestinians’ lives, restricting the transit of products and people in and out of Gaza, violating Gaza’s airspace and its territorial waters, and conducting periodic ground operations. Consequently, Israel’s claim that it no longer held responsibility for the Gaza Strip was widely disputed by international bodies, such as the International Criminal Court and the UN General Assembly, and non-governmental organizations, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.
Second, Palestinian elections were held in 2006 to elect a new Legislative Council, the PNA’s legislature. The result was a victory for Hamas’ Change and Reform list, which received 74 of 132 seats, while the Fatah party of President Mahmoud Abbas received 45 seats in a mixed voting system that included both national party lists and representative districts. Despite longstanding Israeli and American complaints about the corruption of Fatah’s leaders and the US public commitment to promoting democracy in the region, both encouraged Fatah to overthrow the newly-elected Hamas government and hold on to power. Then-US President George W. Bush signed off on a plan calling for Washington’s allies in the region, including Egypt and Jordan, to funnel arms and salaries to Fatah fighters who would lead a coup against the elected Hamas government.
By 2007, Hamas had consolidated its power in Gaza after a brief civil conflict, defeating Fatah fighters and relegating most of the Fatah-dominated PNA structure to the West Bank. With Egyptian collaboration, Israel then instituted a blockade, exacerbating previous restrictions and further limiting the numbers of people and specified categories of goods allowed in and out of the Gaza Strip. Israeli forces also restricted the Gaza coast, allowing fishermen to access only 50% of the fishing waters allocated for this purpose under the Oslo Accords.
Since then, there have been multiple Israeli conflicts in Gaza against Hamas and other militants. However, Israeli military attacks and responses to Hamas and PIJ provocations, intended to dissuade the groups from future attacks, persistently failed, and the Israeli military kept re-engaging in Gaza with growing regularity and increasing ferocity.
As the United States and its partners consider a postwar plan for governance and security in the Gaza Strip, it is important to avoid repetition of the circumstances that contributed to the present conflict, both proximate (retaliation for yet another attack) and strategic (the absence of peace and security, and unfettered economic activity, for Palestinians).
The Israel-Gaza Wars
Looking at the major Israeli incursions into Gaza since the 2007 Hamas takeover demonstrates the futility of Israeli efforts. In November 2008, Israeli soldiers launched a raid into Deir al-Balah in central Gaza to destroy a tunnel, killing several Hamas militants. Israel said the raid was a preemptive strike while Hamas characterized it as a ceasefire violation and responded with rocket fire into Israel. Israel then began Operation Cast Lead with the stated aim of stopping the rocket fire. It was a weeks-long full-blown assault on Gaza involving aerial bombing and a ground invasion.
Thirteen Israelis were reportedly killed, along with1,200-1,400 Palestinians, mostly civilians, alongside damage to housing, businesses, and other infrastructure in Gaza. Amnesty International described the destruction as “wanton,” reporting that many Palestinian civilians were killed in indiscriminate and reckless attacks using imprecise weapons. UN officials determined that both sides committed war crimes. Among other things, the Israeli military used white phosphorus, an incendiary weapon, in populated areas and, according to the UN, intentionally targeted civilians; Palestinian militants had also committed war crimes by shooting rockets at Israeli civilians.
In 2012, after an increase in Hamas rockets launched from Gaza into Israel, Jerusalem retaliated with Operation Pillar of Defense—eight days of airstrikes, killing the head of Hamas’ military wing in Gaza, Ahmed Jabari. An estimated 180 Palestinians, mostly civilians including women and children, died in the fighting. Again, the UN found both sides had committed war crimes.
In 2014, Hamas kidnapped and killed three Israeli teens from the West Bank. In response, Israel launched seven weeks of airstrikes, ground operations, and naval blockades in Gaza, dubbed Operation Protective Edge. Though Israel’s stated target was Hamas militants and their infrastructure in Gaza, at least 2,200 Palestinians were killed, the majority of whom were civilians. Hamas launched rockets into Israel, most of which were intercepted by the Iron Dome air defense system. Half a million Palestinians were displaced, and the operation left Gaza with significant infrastructure damage and shortages of basic goods.
In 2021, violence again broke out following a threat from Israel to evict Palestinian families from their homes in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of East Jerusalem, which includes sites of religious significance for Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Concurrent Israeli restrictions around the al-Aqsa Mosque during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan resulted in violent clashes between Palestinian protesters and Israeli police in East Jerusalem. After demanding that Israel withdraw its security forces from the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, Hamas and the PIJ unleashed a barrage of rockets from Gaza into Israel. Dubbing it Operation Guardian of the Walls, Israel hit back with air strikes on Gaza. The fighting went on for 11 days, killing at least 250 Palestinians and 13 Israelis.
In May 2023, Khader Adnan, a senior PIJ leader in the West Bank, died as a result of an 87-day hunger strike while in an Israeli prison. In response, a hundred rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel. On May 9, Israeli troops initiated Operation Shield and Arrow, a pre-dawn raid on Gaza, killing some PIJ military leaders and ten civilians.
This is not intended to be a comprehensive list, and other skirmishes have similarly led to disproportionate Palestinian casualties. Despite Israel’s vast military superiority and its willingness to engage Hamas and the PIJ, even at the cost of civilian casualties, these efforts have not materially deterred Hamas or other militant groups, as evidenced by Israel’s repeated need to attack Gaza. Israeli politician Ksenia Svetlova describes a Hebrew-language meme that circulated on social media, listing 15 Israeli military operations in Gaza over the past two decades and sarcastically asserting, “For sure, this one will be different.”
Hamas and other militants’ willingness to attack Israel cannot be deterred in the current setting; these groups likely can count on popular acquiescence or support of their attacks, as Palestinians continue to lack individual and communal security, self-determination, and economic freedom. It is also probable that civilian deaths and the destruction of property and livelihood facilitate recruitment into Palestinian militant groups, as victimized individuals look for revenge.
In other words, since 2007, Israeli military operations in Gaza have been more likely to generate more committed Palestinian adversaries in the future, provoking more attacks against Israel, triggering more intense Israeli responses, and laying the foundation for more brutal future conflicts—the very definition of vicious circle.
The Present Conflict
Two new features of the 2023-24 Gaza conflict—its extended duration and Israel’s restriction of assistance to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of its retaliatory war—further demonstrate the futility of the military approach to resolving this conflict. The duration of the conflict has resulted in much greater destruction, loss of civilian life, and displacement than previous conflicts, while the restriction of humanitarian assistance to less than pre-war levels has pushed hundreds of thousands of civilians to the edge of starvation and started shifting the global narrative from Israeli and Palestinian security to Israel’s collective punishment policies and its consequent loss of the worldwide sympathy it enjoyed after October 7.
The Palestinian casualty figures—over 35,000 killed and 77,000 wounded, as of this writing—are the result of concerted Israeli campaigns in urban areas, including attacks against Israeli-designated “safe zones.” Neither Israeli nor Palestinian figures regarding the percentage of the dead who are Hamas or other militants can be considered reliable, although Israeli-provided figures suggest that less than half of Palestinian casualties were militants. The Israeli military uses the indisputable fact that Hamas has facilities in, and conducts attacks from, dense urban areas as cover to attack any civilian target it deems appropriate, irrespective of the consequences for non-combatants.
Moreover, Israeli military forces have attacked health care facilities in Gaza, along with Palestinians and foreign nationals affiliated with aid organizations working to mitigate the widespread and severe consequences of the war. Israel has also attacked first responders, who arrive at the scene after its attacks, and there have been reports of arrests and humiliation of medical personnel. In defense of their actions, Israeli military and political leaders refer to intelligence about Hamas’ use of medical and other civilian facilities and the typically high civilian casualty rates in any urban combat; rarely, Israeli leaders will acknowledge a mistake, as they did after destroying a World Central Kitchen convoy, killing seven.
Even US President Joe Biden, an ardent supporter of Israel, characterized Israel’s attacks in Gaza as “indiscriminate” and “over-the-top,” all while continuing to re-arm the Israeli military and resisting calls to condition US aid to unambiguous Israeli steps to minimize civilian casualties. The United States, of course, understands better than most that military power alone has historically proven incapable of dislodging entrenched insurgencies, having learned that lesson in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
The Future
A strategic reappraisal is necessary if Israel is to forestall Palestinian attacks and the next war more permanently. A review of Israel’s activities vis-à-vis Gaza in the past twenty years suggests an operational, rather than strategic, approach to the Palestinians overall and terrorist attacks in particular. Israel seems to attempt, futilely, to address the latter while ignoring the former. When terrorists are readily willing to die, forsaking what quality of life Israel (and Hamas) have permitted them, they cannot be dissuaded from attacking.
While Israel may be capable of destroying Hamas leaders, weapons caches, infrastructure, and ability to fight in the present conflict, something very much like Hamas will likely re-emerge, as the casus belli of this conflict remains unchanged, and the thousands of Palestinians who have lost a child, parent, sibling, or in some cases entire families will be highly motivated to continue the fight against any Israelis they can reach. If Israel truly desires to end this conflict, not just the battle that began on October 7, it must address the Palestinian issue politically, as military means alone have clearly failed.
If reduction or elimination of violence is their objective, Israeli leaders must explore a totally different relationship with the Palestinians and the territories where they live. Israel’s settlement program, which contributes to Palestinian insecurity and underscores the PNA’s inability to protect ordinary Palestinians and their property, would need to stop. A variant on the failed Oslo plan, separating Israelis and Palestinians from each other, with enhanced security cooperation would need to evolve out of the current crisis; if Palestinians achieve their own state, with genuine political and economic self-determination, rejectionists like Hamas would potentially represent a danger to Palestinian self-governance as well as to Israelis. In this eventuality, Israel would have to treat the new Palestine in much the same way as it treats Jordan or Egypt; it could not violate its sovereignty at will. Something very similar to this peace through separation is also current US policy, and the United States should stand ready to assist in ending this conflict once and for all.
Observers are left wondering if Israel, given its record of futility, truly seeks peace with the Palestinians or prefers instead to retain the territories, despite the human and military costs of managing nearly five million increasingly hostile Palestinians. Ignoring Palestinian demands, has clearly failed to secure Israelis. Some Israeli leaders have openly indicated a desire to maintain control of the Palestinian territories at all costs. Whether this represents the dominant thinking among most Israelis remains to be seen.
Amir Asmar was a senior executive and long-time Middle East analyst in the U.S. Department of Defense, where he authored analyses and provided intelligence briefings to decision-makers throughout the executive and legislative branches. He is an adjunct professor at the National Intelligence University, and his writings can be found at the Council on Foreign Relations, the World Politics Review, and other publications.
Main image: IDF forces and the Israeli Police close the Kisufim checkpoint to citizens by the order of the Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, and the Ministry of Defense. (IDF via Wikimedia)
Views expressed in this article solely reflect those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
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Llama says
Exactly!
Jim says
Thanks for the deep review. I had forgotten a bit of this history.
Dan says
Spot on analysis, though I would question whether the United States has, in fact, learned the lessons of Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.