If there is a way to conduct irregular warfare in the Sahel without the UN and France, Mali has yet to crack the code. Despite the assistance of Turkish Bayraktar drones and Russian mercenaries, the Malian Armed Forces are taking heavy losses from extremist groups and making limited gains against separatist rebels in the country’s north. Recent advances near Kidal are a short-term political victory rather than a military one, and Malian forces are potentially walking into a trap after securing a valley between two mountain ranges. Mali’s approach contributed to a 38% increase in violence against civilians in 2023, with the military and their Wagner Group associates causing many of these incidents.
Mali is not a unique case. Burkina Faso is also struggling after its coup and breakage with France. Instead of mercenaries, Burkina’s leadership opted for popular mobilization to combat armed groups. It has not paid dividends. An attack on an army base and an internally displaced persons camp in Djibo on December 17th killed 40 and injured 42. Like Mali, their drone campaign has resulted in some successful strikes, but also civilian casualties. Though the Kremlin seems keen on military assistance programs, even sending a small number of military personnel to Ouagadougou, it is unclear how committed Moscow can be while still directing the lion’s share of its attention to Ukraine.
Like its neighbors, Niger is closing the door on France after a long standoff. Jihadist violence in Niger is lower than Mali or Burkina Faso today, but a security vacuum created by France’s exit could provide jihadist groups with operational areas in Niamey’s backyard. Unlike Mali and Burkina Faso, Niger maintains an open but tense relationship with the United States following an October 10th State Department declaration that Niger is a coup government and therefore ineligible for some types of aid and security assistance. Yet, the presence of a U.S. drone base with MQ-9 drones, and some balanced messaging from Washington signal ongoing, albeit cautious, U.S. engagement with Niamey.
Despite, or perhaps because of their individual failures, Burkina Faso and Mali are taking the unusual step of forming a defensive alliance to fight an irregular war. The two are now courting the junta that overthrew the government of Niger too. In mid-September, the three signed an agreement forming the “Alliance of Sahel States” (known by its French acronym AES). A November 25th meeting of economic ministers from the three states recommended lofty goals for trade, population movement, and infrastructure, as well as establishing a tripartite airline. However, the pact mostly exists on paper, leaving questions about the form and function of their security cooperation.
Why Ally?
While AES’s function is difficult to nail down, it can be useful to understand the different lenses through which the juntas rationalize and internalize the organization. AES developed from a variety of motivations on the part of the coup leaders. These junta motivations can be grouped into three categories–idealistic, pragmatic, and cynical.
The most idealistic motivation is the belief that an alliance of young(er) Sahelian leaders can cooperate to counter jihadism. Junta leaders cast themselves as representatives of their populations’ interests and portray their predecessors as corrupt, incompetent, and reliant on the UN, France, and the United States. Free from the constraints imposed by the West, Sahelian leaders argue they can take the fight to the towns and villages occupied by the enemy, even if that comes at the cost of civilian casualties.
Shifting to the pragmatic motivations, AES’s inception may also reflect a blend of youth, hierarchical rigidity, and frustration with the status quo. Traoré (34-35), Goïta (40), and even Tchiani (61), the new leaders of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, are members of a younger political-military class that have encountered a glass ceiling. The older generation of Sahelian leaders entrenched themselves in corrupt and self-serving political systems under the veneer of democratic elections. As soldiers, all three rulers witnessed firsthand their countries’ struggles against jihadism and the failure of alliances with the UN, EU, and France to bring stability. Their coups and the forthcoming alliance can thus be seen as an attempt to establish a new order and peace, spearheaded by a younger generation. Although polling and public demonstrations in Niamey, Bamako, and Ouagadougou would suggest popular support for this approach, it is unclear how such arguments play outside national capitals or without other incentives.
A more cynical explanation suggests a variety of motivations for the coup leaders, spanning counterterrorism, regional politics, and relations with Russia. This approach suggests that the coups and alliance-making are the work of a collection of military officers unhappy with their positions and the inflexibility of their states’ political-military structures. In this scenario, coup leaders revolted against their government because they felt both underpaid, underemployed, and under fire. The latter reflects a Western approach to counterterrorism that eschews violence against civilians, particularly one adopted by Operation Barkhane, UN peacekeeping operation MINUSMA, and the EU’s Takuba taskforce. Instead, as seen in more recent strategies in Mali and Burkina Faso, coup leaders prefer to explicitly target civilian populations, particularly Fulani ethnic communities, which they believe to be actively backing jihadist forces. This approach to counterterrorism is brutal and destructive, while likely continuing the cycle of jihadist recruitment, especially in the Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger tri-border region.
This approach can also be applied to regional power politics, where the coups are manifestations of cyclical power dynamics between West Africa’s coastal and landlocked states. Here, landlocked states are attempting to reassert themselves against their wealthier coastal neighbors. The coup leaders are competing with wealthier neighbors, but also neighbors who indirectly benefit from the counterterrorism efforts of the landlocked states.
Lastly, this cynical perspective assumes that alliance members maintain a genuine interest in aligning with Russia for security and political purposes. Thus the coup governments are aligned with Russia’s revanchist world order, where the strong dictate the political order against a Western-based system. As echoed by Russia, junta leaders argue that their approach is motivated by a desire for a multipolar world order and see Russia as a more reliable and formidable counterterrorism partner. While the rhetoric from the coup leaders sometimes supports this idea, it does not hold up to scrutiny. The coup leaders have limited options and take what they can get. Burkina Faso and especially Niger were more cautious about alienating the international community and less eager to rely on Russia than Mali.
Can the Alliance Work?
There are three likely outcomes for the AES. The first is that it succeeds in both stabilizing the junta governments and rolling back terrorist groups. Alternatively, the AES could stabilize the regimes but fail to contain extremist groups, leading to mutually supporting failed states. The final possible outcome could be the collapse of the alliance, characterized by stagnation beyond the initial agreement or the complete dissolution of the pact.
Successful cooperation among Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger is the least likely possibility. Nonetheless, it has a mixed set of consequences. Degrading extremist groups and especially their ability to cross borders with impunity pays dividends for regional counterterrorism efforts and would forestall terrorist expansion into coastal West Africa’s democracies. However, the practical hurdles would be enormous: they would largely be operating without Western partners, and Russia’s ability to supply more arms and contractors is an open question as the conflict in Ukraine continues.
An awkward middle case is successful cooperation among the AES members, but a failure to degrade or defeat terrorist groups. In this scenario, the regimes become increasingly isolated in their capitals but maintain their hold on power. Although any AES counterterrorism operation is likely to fail due to lack of resources, external partners, and civilian targeting strategies, the juntas remaining in power is also unlikely in the long term. Popular disapproval as terrorist groups expand, stress on the security services, and high civilian casualties will likely lead to future coups and rebellions. French and UN withdrawal from Mali already emboldened rebel groups to take advantage of the chaos, and Burkinabe authorities claimed that they foiled a coup attempt in September.
The most likely scenario is that the alliance fails to get off the ground. Lacking a single, strong backer without significant internal conflict, it’s unlikely that alliance partners will be able to provide any substantive support for each other. If anything, a failure to work together may push the coup governments into direct competition. Alternatively, the pact could continue as it exists today–on paper only. The consequences would be severe. Terrorist groups will continue to spread across the Sahel and into West Africa and the juntas will fail to secure meaningful support from any country other than Russia. The choice for the United States and European countries is whether to forge some kind of practical relationship with them before things get worse or hope that coastal West Africa’s democracies can weather the storm with modest western financial and security backing.
What’s Next?
An alliance strengthens the parochial interests of the coup leaders. For all the claims that the Sahelian juntas are in power to defeat terrorism, some of the plotters were motivated as much by poor conditions of the security services and the threat of demotion as they were by a desire to “take the gloves off.” None show any interest in a democratic transition that removes them from power–Mali’s Colonel Goita even launched a second coup to avoid it. In this war, civilian casualties may not be an unfortunate consequence, but an intentional effort to target regions and ethnic groups that the elite consider rebellious or in support of jihadist groups.
However the alliance system plays out among Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, initiating such a system in the first place could have wide-ranging consequences. An alliance can change state leverage and interstate power dynamics. Further, they can play into larger power dynamics, in this case between the United States and Russia. Last, inter or intra-alliance tensions can be exacerbated by outside spoilers.
By aligning together, AES changes the relationship between the governments of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as the now-defunct G5 Sahel. By removing themselves from the G5 Sahel force and continued saber rattling with other ECOWAS members, AES is changing regional and interstate power dynamics. After the coup in Niger, accusations launched between the Nigerien junta and ousted President Bazoum nearly led to conflict between ECOWAS and Niger. With the creation of AES, opposing regional alignments could sleepwalk their way to war.
How could this happen? Jihadist groups may provide a key spoiler, pushing these coalitions to war. West Africa’s open borders are particularly vulnerable to cross-border terrorist activity, with jihadist groups often using neighboring states as safe havens before or after attacks. In the past, ECOWAS states have targeted jihadist groups across these porous borders. However, in a pressure-cooker environment made all the worse by social media coverage of conflict, cross-border targeting could intensify competition or escalate states to conflict under the right circumstances. At worst, cross border attacks could even be seen as an invasion.
For Washington, the most important question is whether to shift its approach towards coup governments and if so, how far. The Niger coup showed that simply leaving a country with a significant U.S. military presence is not a straightforward proposition. The United States needn’t support Mali or Burkina Faso directly, but assistance to Niger against transnational groups could still pay some security dividends to its neighbors at the cost of further entrenching Niger’s military rule in the short term. If policymakers decide to bite the bullet and believe that working with coup regimes is the lesser of two evils, it is likely to drive a wedge between the United States and France rather than put an end to the AES members’ relationship with Russia. For the Sahel’s military regimes, it would be the best of both worlds: more legitimacy and resources from the United States to stay in power, and more tolerance for civilian casualties and the lack of a democratic transition.
Washington has no good options in dealing with these coup governments but ignoring the issue will not make it go away. The Sahel’s cycle of violence will likely continue in Mali and Burkina Faso and expand further into Niger and West African littoral states like Benin. Washington and its allies, particularly Germany, should continue diplomatic and military engagements with Niamey. They must also find a way to overcome diplomatic disputes between Niger and its littoral neighbors, while also encouraging the military regime to set firm dates for a democratic transition. Niger is a critical piece in the West African security puzzle and leaving it to Russia and a tenuous partnership with Mali and Burkina Faso will only exacerbate growing terror trends in West Africa.
Raphael Parens (@MoreSecurityInt) is a Eurasia Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He studies African conflict, Russian military policy, and paramilitary groups. He received his M.A. in international security studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and he is currently based in London.
Marcel Plichta (@plichta_marcel) is a doctoral candidate in international relations at the University of St Andrews and a former analyst for the U.S. Department of Defense. He has previously written on sub-Saharan African security issues and U.S.-Africa policy for Defense One and Foreign Policy.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
A Malian special forces soldier aims his AK-47 during combat reload drills in Loumbila, Burkina Faso on Feb. 14, 2019. This drill encompasses moving, shooting and reloading to encourage effective fighting techniques. (Staff Sgt. Anthony Alcantar via U.S. Army)
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