Introduction
Since its founding in 2002, Boko Haram has plagued Nigeria as one of the country’s deadliest insurgent groups. Nigeria’s civilian population has borne the brunt of this violence, facing a spectrum of threats ranging from murderous attacks and kidnappings to widespread theft by non-state armed groups.
As the Boko Haram insurgency intensified in the early 2010s and the Nigerian Army struggled to secure vast rural areas, local civilians began organizing themselves into armed militias—often referred to as “vigilantes”—to protect their communities. In 2013, the Nigerian government formally began integrating these militias into its conventional forces to bolster its response to terrorist groups. While these community-based fighters have often proven more effective and less brutal than federal forces, helping to restore some public trust, they are not a sustainable long-term solution. Originally conceived to support federal authority, they sometimes appear to completely replace it, creating alternative governance zones based on community logic, which generate further violence in a country that is already deeply divided.
A Sahelian Tradition: Non-State Armed Groups
The practice of ensuring community security with armed civilians has deep roots in the region, dating back centuries. Historically, self-defense groups were established at the local level to safeguard communities. While their origins can be traced to the pre-colonial period, their expansion is more prominent in the latter half of the 20th century, likely due to Sahelian governments struggling with weak institutions, poor governance, and widespread marginalization. These vigilante groups often collaborate with authorities to apprehend criminals within their communities, typically employing non-violent methods. Consisting of unpaid or low-paid civilian volunteers, these groups operate unofficially but are generally recognized by the central government, despite occasionally being implicated in illegal summary executions. Their members are usually armed with sticks, knives, machetes, bows and arrows, and when firearms are present, they are often rudimentary guns crafted locally known as “Dane guns”.
These groups generally fall into four overlapping models: communal, ethnic, religious, and state-affiliated. In the communal category are neighborhood militias, such as the Yan Banga, which originated in the 1970s and now operate continuously in both rural and urban areas, sometimes even serving political purposes. The ethnic category includes traditional hunter guilds, or Yan Farauta, which typically mobilize only in rural areas and only during times of need. Some state-affiliated groups, such as Lakurawa, reportedly operated with the Nigerian government’s awareness. Initially presenting themselves as self-defense forces, these groups were created to help northern Nigerian communities protect themselves from increasingly frequent bandit attacks. Lastly, there is the Hisbah, an Islamic religious militia and moral police force whose mission is to enforce Shari’a law among civilians, operating separately from the other vigilante structures.
Four Overlapping Models
| Category | Examples | Characteristics & Context |
| Communal | Neighborhood Militias (Yan Banga) | Evolved into para-law-enforcement with police backing; patrol urban and rural areas, active continuously. |
| Ethnic | Hunter guilds (Yan Farauta) | Traditional hunter networks, often tied to specific ethnic communities; mobilize during security threats in rural areas. |
| Religious | Hisbah Corps | State-sanctioned Islamic moral police (e.g., Kano State); enforce Shari’a norms, act visibly during the day, coordinate with government. |
| State-Affiliated | Lakurawa | Local vigilante/security groups that emerged during banditry crises; sometimes coordinated or tolerated by authorities; armed with small arms, increasingly formalized. |
In response to regional insecurity, there are few appealing options. Many civilians opt to flee–over 3.3 million individuals have abandoned their homes since the onset of the conflict–while those who remain face the dilemma of either enduring violence, joining terrorist factions, or organizing the defense of their villages. In light of this pressing security need, militias have surged in number since the 2009 Boko Haram uprising, although quantifying the impact of vigilantes remains challenging due to a lack of clear and reliable data. Some self-defense groups, such as a local hunters association from Damboa, have actively resisted jihadists since Boko Haram’s inception.
Outsourcing the Fight Against Terrorism: How Does the State Leverage Local Militias?
The year 2013 witnessed a surge of deadly attacks against civilians, continuing a pattern established in previous years following the failed insurrection of Boko Haram in July 2009 and the resurgence of hostilities led by Abubakar Shekau in late 2010. In light of the gradual loss of rural territories due to the guerrilla tactics employed by armed terrorist groups, Nigeria’s conventional armed forces (the Nigerian Army and the Nigerian Air Force) struggled to effectively counter the jihadist threat. On May 14, 2013, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa.
Simultaneously, the Borno government initiated the formation of a civil militia in Maiduguri aimed at training, arming, and mobilizing local residents. According to popular accounts, in 2013, a militia known as Yan Gora, led by vigilante Baba Jafar Lawan, began capturing terrorists and delivering them to the government’s Joint Task Force (JTF). Federal authorities soon recognized the potential of this collaboration. This led to the establishment of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), which was tasked to support conventional forces by providing intelligence and military assistance, leveraging their intimate knowledge of the local terrain. Their mobilization quickly yielded positive results, as the regional capital of Maiduguri was secured, and many surrounding rural areas were reclaimed.
Among their missions, vigilantes are used to gather intelligence as their knowledge of the locality is very helpful to the entrenched soldiers. They also have a role on the battlefield, as they assure territorial control and operate mostly defensive operations against insurgent attacks. State-level government officials often use them for policing tasks, such as resettling internally displaced persons (IDPs), securing IDP camps, and counter-narcotics initiatives. International donors and NGOs collaborate with local militias for the distribution of humanitarian aid in IDP camps, while national and local politicians often seek to co-opt these militias for their own political agendas. For many local communities, these militias serve as the primary agents of policing and security, fulfilling a range of governance roles, including dispute resolution and judicial functions.
By the mid-2010s, the army’s unpopularity among local civilians became increasingly evident, highlighting the necessity of a civilian force to support military efforts. Numerous violent incidents involving soldiers, including massacres that resulted in mass graves and collateral damage from airstrikes, have significantly undermined trust in military institutions. Civilians find themselves trapped between a violent military and terrorist factions that target any perceived collaborators. There is also considerable distrust toward official authorities, some of whom even appear to be corrupt and influenced by jihadists. Furthermore, the limited presence of army personnel in sensitive and rural areas has intensified the need to recruit locals. Consequently, daily security in Maiduguri, especially in refugee camps, is largely maintained by CJTF patrols. The local militia have rapidly become emblematic of the resistance against Boko Haram and serve as the backbone of the anti-terrorism effort.
Abuse and Manipulation of Militias: The Repercussions of Shared Legitimate Violence.
The actions of the militia also reflect the deep divisions that afflict the country. In 2015, Zamfara (a state in northwestern Nigeria) sought to emulate Borno’s approach by arming local Hausa militias known as Yan Sakai. However, these vigilantes were subsequently accused of launching attacks against rival ethnic communities, the Fulani. Federal government support to local militias exacerbated the ethnic tensions between the Fulani and Hausa groups. Additionally, as these self-defense militias are often beholden to traditional chiefs, they can become embroiled in conflicts with neighboring communities over territorial disputes and may be exploited to maintain the quasi-despotic control of certain local leaders. Well known militia can also turn rogue when newcomers arrive, especially when they don’t share the same devotion to restoring law and order. The Yan Banga militia is an example of the decrepitude of those law-abiding militia. Due to the lack of payment, discipline, and corruption, the militia groups increasingly turned to gangsterism, becoming the very thing they swore to destroy.
Beyond exacerbating communal violence, self-defense groups can transform into political militias during election periods, offering their services to the highest bidder. For instance, former Borno governor Ali Modu Sheriff allegedly armed and utilized a militia group [MJK1] during his 2003 electoral campaign. The issue of political patronage remains a delicate matter within the CJTF hierarchy, as there is a concerted effort to prevent any political figure from seizing control of the group. The potential for self-defense militias to evolve into mafia-like organizations cannot be ignored, as evidenced by the transformation of theBakassi Boysin the southeast.
Conclusion
The ongoing conflict in northeastern Nigeria, driven by the insurgency of Boko Haram and its splinter groups, has profoundly impacted the civilian population and the broader socio-political landscape. The rise of community militias, initially formed as a response to the inadequacies of the Nigerian military, has created a complex dynamic where these groups serve as both protectors and potential sources of further violence. While the integration of local militias into the fight against terrorism has yielded some successes in terms of intelligence gathering and territorial control, it has also led to significant challenges, including the risk of abuse, political manipulation, and the emergence of alternative power structures that can exacerbate existing ethnic and communal tensions.
The reliance on these militias highlights the failures of the state to provide adequate security and governance, forcing communities to take matters into their own hands. However, this reliance comes with the danger of transforming these self-defense groups into entities that may perpetuate violence and corruption, undermining the very stability they were meant to restore. The path forward must involve a careful balance between empowering local communities and maintaining state authority, ensuring that the fight against terrorism does not come at the cost of further division and violence.
Johann Lempereur is a French Research Assistant at the CAPRI think tank. He is an analyst specializing in armed conflict, with extensive experience working alongside the French Army, government administration, and in the research sector. He holds an academic background in international relations and has gained valuable field experience in Nigeria, where he has focused on the evolution of armed conflicts and security dynamics.
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
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Photograph obtained via Flickr and is available for use under Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial. Source: the Center on Conflict and Development at Texas A&M University.
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