Moldova’s September elections reaffirmed its pro-EU course, but continued and increased Russian hybrid and military pressure make constitutional neutrality untenable. Russia’s continued “peacekeeping” presence within the internationally recognized Moldovan territory of Transnistria is a daily direct violation of its constitutional neutrality clause. Expressly stated in Article 11, this neutrality stipulation aimed to prevent the stationing of foreign troops within its borders and yet remains unenforced. Moldova’s constitutional clause also limits its ability to defend itself, effectively demilitarizing the state and barring it from collective defense.
Public opinion on Moldova’s neutrality remains exceptionally high and demands resolute action to enhance its national security. Approximately 54% of Moldovans prefer “neutrality” as the best guarantor of Moldova’s security, which ranks ahead of protection by the EU, a stronger army, NATO collective defense, or closer ties to Russia. Chișinǎu must balance its public’s desire for neutrality with its responsibility to protect that same public. Given the widespread domestic popularity of neutrality, Chișinǎu should evaluate the feasible enforcement of neutrality amidst the Russian hybrid threats.
Moldova’s 2023 National Security Strategy and 2025 Military Strategy outline Russian-centric threats: the invasion of Ukraine, hybrid operations to undermine Moldova’s European direction, and the occupation of Transnistria. These risks complicate Moldova’s policy of neutrality and urge a different strategic approach. The leadership of Moldova must be willing to expand its definition of neutrality to proportionally address these threats.
Direct Military Threat
In the lead-up to Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections, Prime Minister Dorin Recean warned of a potential increased Russian presence within Moldova’s borders, claiming Russia intended to deploy another 10,000 troops to Transnistria. Transnistria remains a source and subject of propaganda, functioning as a military and intelligence outpost for Kremlin-controlled malign efforts. Until Tiraspol and Chișinău resolve the situation, through reintegration or separation, Transnistria will remain a source of instability for both Moldova and the broader region.
Hybrid Threats
Especially prominent on social media, coordinated pro-Russian campaigns target the population in Moldova through disinformation. In advance of 2024’s presidential election and EU referendum, Meta removed fake Facebook networks targeting Russian-speaking Moldovans, many of which impersonated news organizations using titles that sounded credible, such as “Insider Moldova,” “Real Chisinau,” and “Beltsy 24.” The targeted content criticized the president, pro-EU politicians, and the relationship between Romania and Moldova, while supporting pro-Russian politicians and parties. The identified pages, groups, and accounts garnered over 330,000 unique followers before their removals. Russian hybrid threat actors replayed the same playbook the following year against Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections, engaging in impersonation and fear-mongering.
In parallel, Russia engages in political and economic warfare against Moldova. The Kremlin actively bankrolls and organizes electoral interference on the ground via vote-buying, illicit financial networks, and the open backing of pro-Kremlin candidates. In the lead-up to Moldova’s October 2024 presidential election and EU referendum, Moldova’s police and Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office reported that, in September 2024 alone, more than $15 million was directed via Russian banks to the accounts of over 130,000 Moldovan citizens. During the parliamentary elections in September 2025, Russia openly coordinated its internal opposition efforts and launched the Victory Bloc in Moscow, a coalition of pro-Kremlin Moldovan political parties backed by the exiled oligarch Ilan Shor. Ilan Shor is a critical conduit of Russian influence in Moldova, and, in 2023, following a court finding him guilty in the largest bank fraud scandal in Moldovan history and sentencing him in absentia to prison, he was removed from the Moldovan government.
Russian Military Aggression in Ukraine
Proximity to the Russian-targeted Ukrainian port cities of Odesa and Reni exposes risk to Moldova from Russian collateral strikes against Ukraine. Russia has also exploited Moldova’s lack of air defenses to launch missiles and drones through its airspace towards targets in Ukraine. The Russian attacks on Ukraine can have a more direct impact on Moldovans when power lines are cut and oil spills into a highly critical water source. Earlier in the war, Belarusian strongman Aleksandr Lukashenka displayed a map showing a Russian line of advance stretching from Odessa to Transnistria, implying a threat to Moldova and underscoring Moldova’s vulnerability from the war.
Moldova’s Counterthreat Efforts and Recommendations
Following recent parliamentary elections, the newly seated cabinet of ministers adopted Moldova’s 2025-2035 military strategy. In it, Moldova defines its approach as similar to that of Austria or Ireland, claiming participation in “regional and international security mechanisms, military exercises,” and “international missions” is not mutually exclusive from its neutrality status. This reflects an understanding that, aside from mutual defense treaties, Moldova should not see neutrality as a constraint on its international participation and defense development.
Information Security and Election Resiliency
Beset by propaganda surrounding September’s parliamentary elections, the Moldovan government placed its counterpropaganda apparatus under President Maia Sandu. The Center for Strategic Communication and Combating Disinformation (CCSCD), also known as ‘Patriot’ or StratCom, engages in “name-and-shame” tactics, publishing citizen-facing reports to build public resilience. From civil society, several organizations, including WatchDog.MD and StopFals, are helping fill Moldova’s counter-disinformation gap.
Externally, the EU has recommitted to assisting Moldova’s resilience against hybrid threats through its European Union Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova (EUPM Moldova). EUPM Moldova has been instrumental in the establishment of CCSCD, Moldova’s new Cyber Security Agency, and the National Crisis Management Centre. Additional countermeasures should include establishing periodic wargaming to counter hybrid threats. Moldova should establish a recurring program of hybrid threat exercises in partnership with the highly capable European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), a Helsinki-based organization that supports NATO- and EU-member states in identifying and responding to gray-zone tactics. By collaborating with the Centre, Chișinǎu could sharpen its interagency coordination through its CCSCD architecture and increase its nascent capability to counter these threats. These recurring exercises should become a standing part of Moldova’s security posture and enable the development of Moldova’s counter-hybrid system: defense forces, intelligence, cyber defense, and electoral systems.
Military Counter-Air Equipping and Joint Training
To address recurring overflights and drone incursions, Moldova proposed an airspace security law in June 2025 and accepted an EU package worth €60 million to purchase short-range air defense,command and control, and mobility systems.
Since 2023, joint exercises with the United States and Romania have improved infantry, artillery, and battlefield medical readiness without transgressing formal neutrality. The increased interoperability with Western militaries, derived from these training events, conveys a clear message of deterrence to the Kremlin. The exercise foci suggest that Moldovan forces are not only preparing for peacekeeping, but also for possible hot conflict scenarios. This reflects a quiet shift in Moldova’s defense strategy in response to Russia’s invasion and the enduring threat from Transnistria. With each exercise iteration, Moldovan armed forces become increasingly aligned with NATO training and readiness standards, something the Kremlin openly laments.
To build on existing training momentum, Moldova should expand partner training to include air-defense operations on new systems.Moldova’s armed forces have conducted recurring joint exercises with the United States and Romania since 2015. These exercises strengthen Moldova’s ground capacity, but its air defense preparedness remains critically limited. Without deliberate training, Moldova’s armed forces risk being underprepared to use their new air surveillance and air defense systems in a real scenario. These efforts will make Moldova a more capable and secure partner on NATO’s eastern flank, even within the constraints of constitutional neutrality.
Conclusion
The throughline for the Republic of Moldova is clear: a secure future is one that is integrated with allies. Moldova has already demonstrated a willingness to reevaluate its neutrality in the face of mounting threats to its homeland. Neutrality is a vulnerability that Moscow can exploit. De facto violations of neutrality, such as airspace violations and Russian troops within Moldova, invalidate the concept of neutrality as security. If Chișinău does not take action to expand collaboration with its democratic partners, it risks falling further into a strategic and exposed limbo, becoming more vulnerable to deliberate coercion, destabilization, and disillusionment.
For the West, Moldova is a willing partner. The current Moldovan PAS government sees the West as its future. Moldova is learning critical lessons from its experience on the receiving end of Russian hybrid threats–lessons the West can learn from Moldova. As Moldova continues its EU accession process, Western partners should encourage Moldova to join European defensive structures. Russia is already demonstrating that they see Moldova’s joining the EU as a threat and not neutrality. Resilience requires willing alignment.
Thomas Austin Thompson is a researcher at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service, where he studies Eurasian, Russian, and Eastern European politics and cultures. He is an active-duty United States Air Force officer.
Main image: Moldovan soldiers training at Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. Taken from DVIDS.
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
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