Every April 15, the Russian Federation celebrates Electronic Warfare Specialist Day, marking the first combat use of electronic warfare. On this day in 1904, during the Japanese shelling of the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur, the battleship Pobeda and a coastal radio post jammed Japanese radio communications, preventing over 60 cannon shells from hitting their targets. This operation, which severely disrupted the Imperial Japanese Navy’s command and control, is considered the birth of what we now know as Electronic Warfare (EW). Today, Russia continues to prioritize EW, employing it to notable effect in Syria, Ukraine, and now the Black Sea. This article seeks to understand EW and its relationship to irregular warfare, focusing on Russian practices and capabilities.
What is electronic warfare?
EW involves using radio and electromagnetic signals to protect or disrupt communications and equipment. It has three distinct branches: electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic support (ES). EA targets enemy radars, communications radios, and navigation systems using radio waves for jamming purposes, aiming to degrade or neutralize their effectiveness. In contrast, EP is dedicated to shielding against such jamming attempts, ensuring communications and systems remain functional despite enemy interference. Lastly, ES deals with detecting and locating electromagnetic emissions, often leading to confusion with Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), as both involve activities relating to intercepting electromagnetic usage by adversaries.
The distinction between ES and SIGINT within US doctrine is significant, hinging on the purpose, scope, and entity controlling the operation. In the US, ES primarily serves the tactical needs of operational commanders, while SIGINT operates as an intelligence-gathering function, subject to distinct authorities and policies. SIGINT is further categorized into Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), and Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT), each focusing on different aspects of intelligence collection. COMINT zeroes in on intercepting and analyzing enemy radio communications to pinpoint the location and intentions of adversaries. ELINT focuses on collecting data from enemy radar systems and other non-communicative electronic signals to identify threats and support mission planning. FISINT gathers information from foreign electronic equipment, such as missiles or satellites, to learn about their capabilities and operational patterns.
How does Russia use EW?
Russian sources define electronic warfare (EW) as a form of armed struggle in which radio emissions (radio interference) affect the electronic means of enemy control, communication and intelligence systems to change the quality of military information circulating in them, protect their systems from similar influences, and change the conditions (properties of the environment) of radio wave propagation. In Russian sources, EW is referred to as Radio-Electronic Warfare (радиоэлектронная борьба).
In contrast to the approach taken by NATO countries, where EW has arguably been kept somewhat separate from other military operations, Russia integrates EW closely with all branches of its military. EW capabilities are embedded across Russia’s land, sea, and air forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Militaries use radio waves on the battlefield for communications, radar and navigation. Ships, vehicles, aircraft, weapons, sensors, bases, and personnel depend on these capabilities to communicate, navigate, and for situational awareness.
This integration is likely due to the less restrictive classification of EW operations within Russian forces compared to the highly sensitive nature of EW activities in NATO militaries. It is also likely due to the Russian approach to modern warfare:a continuum versus a clearly delineated conventional versus unconventional battlefield. Russian doctrine treats EW as an integral part of operational art, essential for disrupting, degrading, and ultimately destroying enemy command and control and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. This more comprehensive view positions EW as a cornerstone of Russia’s broader information warfare doctrine.
Russian EW capabilities
Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities encompass diverse systems that neutralize threats across different domains. The Krasukha Electronic Warfare Complex, including the “Krasukha-S4” and “Krasukha-2,” targets low-Earth orbit spy satellites, airborne radars, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and enemy radar stations with the intent to disrupt navigation and communications. The “Moscow-1” complex excels in passive electronic reconnaissance and coordination of EW systems over a vast area. The “Murmansk-BN” specializes in jamming short-wave radio communications, boasting a remarkable operational range that could disable NATO aerospace and radar complexes. The “Saphir” complex represents the latest advancement in EW, designed to counter unmanned vehicles through automatic classification and suppression, while the Orlan-10 UAV performs dual roles in reconnaissance and EW. Russia’s anti-drone technologies, including electromagnetic guns like the Harpoon-3 and Silok systems, focus on severing control links to protect against UAV attacks. Underpinning these technological advancements is the Military Research Institute of Electronic Warfare (MIEW), which spearheads training, research, and development in EW disciplines, showcasing Russia’s commitment to maintaining a leading edge in electronic warfare capabilities.
Russian EW in Syria and the Black Sea
Russian EW capabilities have been on full display in Syria and the Black Sea region. Speaking at the 2018 GEOINT Symposium, General Raymond A. Thomas III, the then-commander of US Special Operations Command, characterized Russia’s actions in Syria as “the most aggressive electronic warfare on the planet.” He highlighted Syria, much like Ukraine today, as a proving ground: “They are testing us every day, knocking our communications down, disabling our EC-130s, etc.” Despite the Russian military’s aggressive EW posture in Syria, Western and allied responses have been relatively slow in recognizing and countering the threat.
In the Black Sea, EW has been used to jam precision-guided munitions that depend on satellite navigation signals. Leaked documents from the US Department of Defense in 2022 revealed that some American-supplied weapons, which rely on these satellite signals for accuracy, are susceptible to Russian jamming efforts. This includes weapons like the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), both of which use satellite navigation to enhance their targeting precision. Russian EW efforts have been successful in degrading the performance of the satellite receivers in these weapons, degrading their accuracy. Worryingly, the power of Russian counter-satellite systems has been enough to degrade the encrypted ‘M-Code signals’ from the US GPS constellation, overwhelming these signals with more powerful jamming emissions. Russian media has exploited these vulnerabilities in information campaigns to undermine confidence in the success of Ukrainian forces and the reliability of US and allied weaponry.
Russian military analysts tend to regard the operations in Ukraine as a testing ground, particularly highlighting the use of electronic warfare (EW) against Turkish Bayraktar drones, a topic that has been extensively written about. During the early months of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Bayraktar TB2 drones were considered a potent weapon for Ukraine. This is no longer the case. According to prominent Russian military supplier ROSTEC quoted in Gazeta: “A variety of electronic warfare systems are now successfully being tested in combat: they jam the enemy’s communication channels, guidance systems, leaving them without eyes and ears.” According to the same source, EW is employed as an effective means to deal with drones; it suppresses control and data transmission channels between the operator and the drone, as well as satellite navigation.
Russian GPS jamming also impacts commercial activities. A snapshot taken on January 27, 2024, illustrates the widespread GPS interference observed in the Black Sea. As depicted above, it primarily aims to shield Russian vessels from precision-guided munitions. However, a secondary consequence of this jamming may disrupt civilian maritime navigation for Ukrainian and other international ships. This situation underscores the complexities of EW within Information Warfare: Russian ships might suffer from jamming similar to Ukrainian and international vessels. Yet, it is important to note that GPS and GLONASS (the Russian satellite navigation system) operate on distinct frequency bands, suggesting Russian vessels could potentially navigate with less disruption.
Conclusion
Russia’s military places a higher priority on EW, employing these capabilities across all levels of war. Moscow’s military deployments to Syria and Ukraine illustrate that EW is intrinsic to Russian force disposition. Worryingly, Russia’s use of EW, particularly counter-GPS systems, extends beyond the battlefield, adversely affecting non-combatants in places like the Black Sea region. Three aspects warrant more attention from US and allied defense analysts: 1) the ubiquity of Russian EW across all levels of war 2) the superior integration of Russian EW within maneuver units compared to NATO counterparts; and 3) the extensive and effective application of EW by Russia in conflict zones like Syria and Ukraine. These three factors are closely linked to irregular warfare within the broader context of Russo-American strategic rivalry in Europe and elsewhere. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine underscores the extent to which Russian EW capabilities can challenge existing expectations of electromagnetic spectrum dominance. Physics is at the heart of EW, and as Isaac Newton’s third law of motion states, every action has an equal and opposite reaction.
Dr. Olga R. Chiriac is the Project Europe Director at the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Sociology and Social Work of the University of Bucharest, and a Fellow at the Research Institute of the University of Bucharest, where she co-directs the Black Sea Program. She is a 2022 US State Department Title VIII Black Sea Fellow. Her book “Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation: Implications for Black Sea Security” was published by Palgrave Macmillan in February 2024.
Dr. Thomas Withington is an analyst and writer specializing in electronic warfare, radar, and military communications. He has written widely on these subjects for a range of specialist and general publications. He also works as a consultant and adviser in these areas for several leading government and private-sector clients. Furthermore, Dr. Withington provides regular commentary on security and defense aspects of electromagnetic spectrum use for major media organizations around the world.
Main Photo: U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to “Wild Bill” Platoon, 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment and 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment conduct electronic warfare training during Combined Resolve XV, Feb. 23, 2021 at the Hohenfels Training Area. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Julian Padua)
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
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