This piece was selected as a finalist in an essay contest co-sponsored by IWI and the Joint Staff J7 Office of Irregular Warfare and Competition (OIWC). The views expressed do not represent the position of IWI or the US Government, including the Joint Staff J7 OIWC.
In directing a redistribution of US military and intelligence resources from counterterrorism missions to escalating strategic competition with China, US defense planners have made a risky assumption: that China intends to confront its adversaries through conventional military engagements. History, in fact, suggests a more complex reality—that America’s adversaries have identified US weaknesses in the irregular realm, and therefore intend to fight asymmetrically, in the so-called “grey zone” between outright war and peace. As the latest book by leading national security scholar Seth G. Jones theorizes, “While conventional warfare—clashes between large military forces—defined twentieth-century power, irregular warfare will increasingly define international politics in the coming decades.” In its eagerness to “pivot” from counterterrorism to great power competition, then, the US military establishment has overlooked many of the key advantages the former might bring to the latter.
Perhaps the most frequent criticism levied at America’s international counterterrorism missions concerns cost. For much of the so-called “forever war,” those concerns were valid and important, particularly considering that inevitably doomed regime change and democratization remained key aspects of the strategy. But they have grown outdated—by 2021, for example, the United States’ presence in Afghanistan was limited to just 3,000 troops who had assumed a far more limited counterterrorism mission and were suffering substantially fewer casualties. As terrorism expert Matthew Levitt has argued, and as eventually rang true in Afghanistan, “The few military deployments necessary to maintain an effective counterterrorism posture are the polar opposite of ‘endless wars’ in terms of size, cost, and risk, and should be pursued in support of international coalitions and local allies.” In fact, the badly botched Afghanistan withdrawal—and the violence and repression that has followed—provided perhaps the ultimate illustrative example of how and why counterterrorism remains so central to US national security and foreign policy.
There are multifaceted concerns over China’s rise—that Beijing threatens America’s allies politically and militarily, that it therefore will undermine US global hegemony, and that a direct military confrontation between the two states is therefore increasingly inevitable. Each can at least incrementally be addressed through an American willingness to engage in irregular warfare like counterterrorism. Kinetic, tactical counterterrorism does not just play a critical role in managing and degrading terrorist groups and their safe havens—itself still a worthy endeavor—but also helps shore up America’s political and military alliances and promotes readiness and versatile forward-basing.
Firstly, and most importantly, terrorism has simply not receded as a national security threat, and only tactical counterterrorism can ensure terrorist organizations and safe havens are managed effectively, that the threat to the US homeland and its allies is therefore degraded, and that the United States can therefore safely focus on other national security and foreign policy initiatives, to include great power relations. Since 9/11, the US government has led a global counterterrorism assassination campaign that has eliminated the leadership of several major international groups, in Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, and beyond, which has successfully kept the homeland safe from all but one coordinated plot orchestrated by such groups. America’s campaign, spearheaded largely by the US drone program but also through special operations forces raids, have kept terrorist organizations on the defensive, thereby crippling international operations and disrupting safe havens. Pretending that such groups and the threat they pose have disappeared will only encourage complacency, in which terrorist groups thrive—and, in a worst-case scenario, might allow a major attack that would draw the United States back into a more significant engagement. Counterterrorism also plays an important role in combatting state-sponsored terrorism and can therefore dismantle an important tool great power rivals use to sow discord and undermine US interests.
Secondly, counterterrorism plays an important role in developing America’s relationships with allies and shoring up its international political and military alliances. After 9/11, NATO triggered its hallowed Article 5 collective defense principle for the first and only time. For the next 20 years, an international coalition fought at the United States’ side against the terrorist organizations that conducted and facilitated the attack. Such a coalition was also stood up to combat the Islamic State’s so-called caliphate in the Levant. International military alliances not only strengthen the political and cultural ties between the United States and its allies but encourage higher standards and institutionalize the combined operations that the United States would undoubtedly rely upon in any actual kinetic confrontation with China. Turning its back on those relationships hurts the United States’ strategic position and undermines its dependability among its allies. In perhaps the most venomous criticism of the Afghan withdrawal, Tony Blair, the former British prime minister who staked his political future on defending the United States, described the withdrawal as “tragic, dangerous, [and] unnecessary,” and driven “in obedience to an imbecilic political slogan”—a seething statement from a jilted ally.
Beyond alliances, tactical counterterrorism also strengthens US bilateral relations with weaker partners plagued by insurgent threats. In the Belt-and-Road era, the United States must emphasize and offer its own comparative advantages, such as counterterrorism, to smaller states, to ward off Chinese influence. While higher-order goals of regime change or even democratization have consistently failed, more narrowly defined (though often maligned) missions to build capacity or to support allied-led counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities have succeeded in strengthening partner forces and degrading terrorist adversaries. For evidence, look no further than the successful Kurdish ground campaign against the Islamic State’s territory in Syria. Supported by US intelligence and air assets, the Syrian Democratic Forces not only militarily defeated the terrorist organization, but also deepened their partnership with the United States. Capacity-building and support, when done right, allows US counterterrorism to lead not from the front but from the rear—ensuring both enduring counterterrorism success and stronger US partnerships. In the words of retired Air Force major general Marcus Hicks, “By proving that it can master complex political situations and achieve desired goals, the United States will improve its credibility and influence abroad, which is fundamental to competing with rival powers.”
Thirdly, America’s global counterterrorism endeavor allows the Pentagon to dispatch its elite troops for real-world training, another factor carrying important implications for escalating strategic competition. Preparation for conflict with China is not an all-or-nothing proposition; as Michael C. Horowitz and Dan A. Shalmon write, “The United States should recognize that not all parts of the military have to be optimized for the same task.” In its eagerness to move forward from Afghanistan, Washington gave up important strategic basing—in a country that shares land borders with China, Iran, and former Soviet republics—as well as a venue where the country’s elite troops could train, conduct joint operations, and collaborate with allies. Moreover, if ever the escalating tensions with China turn hot, irregular warfare will play a central role; prosecuting a fight relying heavily on intelligence, special operations, and partner forces was, therefore, valuable preparation for whatever comes next in the great power confrontation. Additionally, the worst-case scenario of rising tensions with Beijing—that it will result in an invasion of Taiwan that will ultimately pull the United States into direct confrontation with China—is made far less likely by China’s self-described “peace disease,” the fear that China’s lack of war experience will cripple its performance in its next kinetic confrontation. America’s irregular counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan, then, was itself a form of deterrence.
Washington has often faced criticism for its strategic failures in Afghanistan, but the botched withdrawal was more accurately caused by a failure of grand strategy: notably, the idea that the Afghan war had to end in victory or defeat, and that it was unsustainable. The United States was not winning in Afghanistan, but it also was not losing. A more nuanced perspective and dispassionate analysis of the ongoing war would have allowed decision-makers to see that the war was actually filling an important role in both international counterterrorism as well as America’s escalating strategic competition. Iain King said it well: “Great-power competition is certainly back, but it would be a mistake to regard NATO’s enduring operation in Afghanistan as a distraction or a detour […] Rather, the long war in that country has prepared the West for today’s challenges.”
To be sure, conventional capabilities are important, and the United States will need to find ways to deter rival aggression. But counterterrorism and great power conflict are far from zero-sum. Great power conflict will not just be fought in Ukraine and Taiwan, but in Syria, Mali, and other proxy states where terrorism remains a major concern. Irregular warfare must therefore remain a critical component in US defense strategy. The Afghanistan withdrawal was further evidence of US bias towards fighting the war it wants, not the war it actually faces. There is little doubt that America’s rivals in Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran would have celebrated watching the calamitous withdrawal play out over their TV screens. But they should also celebrate Washington turning its back on counterterrorism.
Blindly focusing on hot, large-scale conventional conflict with China will rob the US military and intelligence community of several important weapons—weapons that might otherwise be effectively deployed in the escalating strategic competition environment.
Jacob Ware is a research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), where he studies domestic and international terrorism and counterterrorism. He is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, where he teaches a class on violent far-right extremism. Jacob’s analysis has appeared in publications including the Wall Street Journal, Military Times, Foreign Policy, National Interest, Lawfare, War on the Rocks, and the CTC Sentinel. He holds a master’s degree in security studies from Georgetown, and completed his undergraduate studies at the University of St Andrews.
Photo: US Army Special Forces soldiers in Raqqa, Syria. Credit: Delil Souleiman.
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