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Since the outset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, logistics have played a critical role in determining the course of the war. Recognizing this vulnerability, Ukrainian special operations and intelligence services, partnered with both Ukrainian and Russian partisans, have embarked on a continuous campaign to degrade Russia’s rail transportation infrastructure. This unconventional warfare sabotage campaign has increasingly gained momentum, showing the potential effectiveness of this strategy as a supporting effort in future conflicts.
Russian military strategy is completely dependent on its rail networks to sustain the massive logistics efforts required for the sort of large-scale combat operations (LSCO) we see today in Ukraine. With a vast geography and relatively limited alternatives for large-scale transport, the Russian military needs efficient railways to move troops, equipment, and supplies. Throughout history, including during World War II, reliance on its rail network for military logistics has created an “Achilles’ Heel” exploitable through contemporary unconventional warfare.
The nature of rail infrastructure makes it a prime target for sabotage. Unlike dispersed roadways, rail networks are relatively centralized, with key nodes, bridges, and junctions acting as chokepoints. Understanding this, Ukrainian special operators and intelligence services operating by, with, and through various Russian resistance groups have strategically targeted these key nodes to great effect. “Stop the Wagons” and the “Combat Organization of Anarcho-Communists” are the two most prominent Russian political groups expressing their opposition to the war by sabotaging railway infrastructure.
Motivated by their opposition to the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine and its domestic policies, Russian partisans have taken bold steps to degrade their own country’s military infrastructure, demonstrating some level of internal resistance to the war. As Russian public opinion turns increasingly against the Kremlin’s war, it is possible that this domestic Russian resistance will grow in strength and confidence. The campaign to sabotage Russian rail networks began soon after Moscow’s full-scale invasion, initially with sporadic attacks by Ukrainian special forces and sympathetic dissidents. However, it has since evolved into a more systematic and coordinated effort, driven by both Ukrainian intelligence agencies and increasingly by local partisan groups in both the occupied Ukrainian territories and Russia.
One of the most successful sabotage attacks occurred in December 2023, when Ukrainian operatives caused severe damage to the Severomuysky railway tunnel deep in eastern Russia. A notable recent attack involved the sabotage of the railroad bridge in Kinel, a vital artery for military logistics. While the bridge was not destroyed, the damage caused significant disruption to rail operations, interrupting the movement of military supplies and illustrating the potential impact of such attacks. Similar sabotage efforts have targeted railway lines, switching stations, and supply depots across Russia and the occupied Ukrainian territories. These disruptions create logistical headaches for the Russian military, forcing them to reroute transport through longer or less efficient paths, further straining their already challenged logistics capabilities. Even before the latest blast at Kinel, Russian transportation officials had been warning loudly that Russia’s rail network is on the verge of a catastrophic collapse.
Beyond the immediate disruption, these sabotage campaigns have far-reaching implications. Russia’s military doctrine relies on a consistent flow of supplies to sustain its forces at the front. Any interruption, particularly in the context of a war where Russian forces are already stretched thin, can have cascading effects on operations. Sabotage-induced delays in resupply can reduce the availability of ammunition and critical supplies to front-line units, degrade morale, and limit Russia’s ability to execute offensive operations. The Ukrainian intelligence and special operations services have helped build up the capabilities and direct the activities of both Ukrainian and Russian partisan organizations against a range of targets, building on organizational efforts in eastern Ukraine before the full-scale Russian invasion as well as outreach to Russian groups long opposed to Putin’s regime.
With each successful attack, the Kremlin is forced to invest additional resources into repairing and protecting its rail infrastructure—resources that could otherwise be used on the battlefield. Such a strategy recalls many memories of the joint “Jedburgh” operations conducted between the British Special Operations Executive and American Office of Strategic Services to enable French Resistance activities against the occupying German forces during World War II. Similarly, the Ukrainian campaign has undermined Russia’s ability to project power, slowing the movement of reinforcements and creating bottlenecks in critical supply lines much like how the Jedburgh missions delayed the German response to the Normandy landings in June of 1944.
To maximize the impact of this ongoing Ukrainian sabotage campaign, Kyiv has several options to expand its reach and effectiveness. These actions also offer valuable lessons for Western special operators and their local resistance partners. First, increasing collaboration between Ukrainian intelligence services and local partisans within occupied Ukraine and across the breadth of Russia is essential. The Ukrainian government could continue to provide support, training, and resources to partisan groups, enhancing their ability to carry out increasingly complex sabotage operations. This could include the provision of technical expertise, explosives, and other specialized equipment needed to target key rail infrastructure. Additionally, increased information operations could leverage the growing internal Russian resistance to the Kremlin’s invasion, further strengthening partisan efforts and potentially creating a decentralized resistance campaign across the country.
Second, expanding the scope of the campaign to target additional logistical hubs and critical nodes within the rail network could increase the cumulative impact. While key bridges and rail lines have been targeted, focus on railway depots, maintenance yards, and switching stations, though less vulnerable, play an essential role in the smooth functioning of the rail network and would create longer-lasting disruptions if damaged. As the internal Russian resistance grows stronger, these additional targets may become more accessible.
Third, leveraging modern technology and intelligence to enhance the precision of these attacks will be vital. Satellite imagery, drone reconnaissance, and signals intelligence can help identify the most vulnerable points within Russia’s vast rail network. This would allow for more surgical strikes that can have outsized effects with minimal risk to operatives on the ground. Given the remoteness of large swaths of Russia’s territory, technological means are often the only efficient way of identifying vulnerabilities for Ukrainian special operators, intelligence operatives, and Russian partisans to target.
The ongoing sabotage campaign against Russia’s rail transportation network, driven by Ukrainian special operations forces and intelligence services—and executed in coordination with partisans in occupied Ukraine and across Russia—is a critical element in undermining the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine. By targeting this logistical backbone, the campaign is exploiting key vulnerabilities in Russia’s ability to sustain its forces. Expanding this effort, with increased coordination, precision, and international support, can further degrade Russia’s war machine and bring about a decisive turning point in the conflict. With every bridge damaged and rail line disrupted, Ukraine moves one step closer to stopping Russia. For the rest of the world, the example set by, and lessons learned from the Ukrainian unconventional warfare sabotage campaign are invaluable as we consider how the US and its allies might fight future wars.
Doug Livermore is the Senior Vice President for Solution Engineering at the CenCore Group and the Deputy Commander for Special Operations Detachment – Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. In addition to his role as the Director of Engagements for the Irregular Warfare Initiative, he is the National Director of External Communications for the Special Forces Association, National Vice President for the Special Operations Association of America, Director of Development of the Corioli Institute, and serves and the Board of Directors and as Chair of the Advocacy Committee for No One Left Behind.
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
Main Image: Anti-terrorist operation in eastern Ukraine (Photo via the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine).
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