Introduction
US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) provide a unique advantage to the Joint Force with their responsiveness, adaptability, and specialized skills. USSOF capabilities—from cyber expertise to civil affairs—enable them to shape and stabilize regions and preempt threats before they escalate. USSOF is incredibly impactful in Irregular Warfare, where they enhance partner nations’ abilities to counter or resist hostile powers. USSOF has proven effective in strengthening partner resistance and promoting a “Total Defense” posture in gray zone conflicts. This concept is best outlined in the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) and has been demonstrated by the Ukrainian version of “Total Defense” in the face of Russian aggression.
However, despite significant US support for Ukraine, current US Security Cooperation (SC) mechanisms do not adequately empower USSOF’s support for ally and partner resistance efforts. Given the growing importance of irregular warfare in strategic competition, SC mechanisms must evolve. Policymakers across the SC enterprise should explore how tailored authorities, processes, and oversight can better enable USSOF support for resistance activities.
Resistance in Ukraine
Over the past decade, Ukraine has progressively incorporated resistance tactics into its national defense strategy, and in 2021, the Government of Ukraine (GOU) codified Ukraine’s “Total Defense” posture. The national resistance mindset became apparent in the early days of the current conflict when guerilla attacks on Russian supply lines—perpetrated by local civilians and reservists —rendered several Russian positions unsustainable. Indeed, the GOU published the National Resistance Center website to disseminate news and offer how-to guides on reporting Russian troop movements, securing communications, and conducting sabotage. Ukraine’s Territorial Defense Forces (TDF)—a “people’s army” within the Ukrainian Armed Forces—exemplify “voluntary organizations” integral to Total Defense. That is not to suggest that Ukrainian resistance is exclusively government-directed. Endogenous Ukrainian resistance partially originates from decades of popular frustration with the Ukrainian state itself. However, the point remains that resistance permeates Ukrainian society; ordinary Ukrainians have sourced and delivered essentials like vehicles and batteries directly to soldiers, bypassing slow government channels. Ukrainian civilians in Russian-occupied territories are creating roadblocks, organizing protests, and providing intelligence. Deeply ingrained Ukrainian resistance raises the question: to what extent have USSOF efforts shaped Ukraine’s resistance against Russian aggression?
While USSOF operations are predictably classified, specific US engagements offer clues to answering this question. Following Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea, the US intensified efforts to strengthen Ukrainian resistance capacity. This included the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) Minister of Defense Advisor (MODA) program to train and educate Ukrainian forces on NATO doctrine and USSOF efforts to professionalize Ukrainian SOF by building a “special operations capability, culture, and joint warfighting organization.” Before the current conflict, USSOF deployed Army Special Forces, civil affairs, psychological operations soldiers, Navy Seals, and senior advisors on long-term assignments to help craft Ukraine’s “national security methods,” many of which align with tactics prescribed in the ROC. While Ukrainians are unequivocally leading their resistance, USSOF and its partners have helped lay the foundation for Ukraine’s Total Defense approach for nearly a decade.
The US Security Cooperation Enterprise
USSOF’s resistance-oriented security cooperation activities—in Ukraine and elsewhere—rely on several funding and authority mechanisms. In the Ukrainian context, DoD relies largely on Section 127d of US Code Title 10—part of broader “emergency and extraordinary expenses”—to support USSOF irregular warfare activities. More broadly and on a non-emergency basis, USSOF’s resistance-oriented security cooperation activities also fall under Section 333 of US Code Title 10, which authorizes the DoD to work with the Department of State to provide training, equipment, and other assistance to partner security forces through annual appropriations. Both are imperfect mechanisms that fail to address the current USSOF problem set and operating environment.
As part of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress enacted section 127d “Support of Special Operations for Irregular Warfare” (replacing Sec. 1202) to offer dedicated support for USSOF irregular warfare operations. The funds for this authority are derived from the DoD’s operations and maintenance budget. Section 127d provides broader Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) authority compared to prior iterations and raises the funding cap to $20 million per fiscal year. It authorizes the SECDEF to fund irregular warfare operations with the concurrence of the relevant Chief of Mission. The SECDEF is prohibited from delegating this authority and must notify Congress 15 days before providing funds to support ongoing operations.
Section 333 security cooperation is effectively planned, executed, and monitored by the security cooperation enterprise or the array of interagency actors collaborating in the Significant Security Cooperation Initiative (SSCI) process. Key security cooperation stakeholders include entities across the DoD, such as the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency; the Department of State, including the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; the Combatant Commands; and U.S. Embassies, where Defense Attachés and Security Cooperation Officers play a critical role. Each actor plays a different role in the multi-phase SSCI process of planning and executing SC programs.
The SSCI approval process starts with the Combatant Command’s partner assessment and Initiative Design Document (IDD), which identifies needs and outlines a proposed program. This is followed by a DSCA-led feasibility study—including a Rough Order of Magnitude pricing to estimate costs—before the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy reviews proposals and issues approvals. The office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy then prioritizes and allocates resources, and corresponding programs are implemented by embassies in coordination with the Combatant Commands and DSCA.
Critical Deficiencies
Notwithstanding successful Ukrainian resistance, current mechanisms are ill-equipped to meet USSOF’s needs as it expands gray zone activities. Section 127d is an emergency measure useful for urgent requirements but insufficient for supporting global USSOF operations on an ongoing basis. The relatively low 20-million-dollar annual cap restricts the impact and scope of operations. The delegation restriction could also hinder fund deployment when decision speed is critical. Furthermore, section 127d also creates a somewhat restrictive legal framework that could limit USSOF’s ability to engage in certain contexts, particularly those classified as covert actions. Finally, the 15-day congressional notification requirement could compromise operational security and delay time-sensitive missions, presenting an obstacle in dynamic combat environments.
The SSCI process is likewise ill-equipped to meet the USSOF’s needs. First, consider the time horizon. The SSCI process can take one to two years from requirement identification through SC program implementation. This poses obvious challenges for maintaining operational effectiveness in irregular warfare, which is characterized by dynamic, indirect, and continuous employment of multi-domain tactics. Second, although USSOF comprises just 3% of DoD’s budget, it must compete with all other Combatant Commands for Section 333 funding.
USSOF’s unique operational mandate necessitates a middle-ground, one that combines the streamlined nature of the 127d authority with the rigor and oversight of the SSCI process. Acknowledging that excessive authorities risk complicating oversight, a narrowly defined funding authority that addresses both the 127d and SSCI deficiencies is needed.
Refined Process, Authorities, and Oversight
A new “middle-ground” authority could build upon the most successful elements of these mechanisms. A tiered funding cap—offering scaled support based on threat levels or operational priorities—should be introduced to better support USSOF’s global mandate. The 127d restriction on delegation should be adjusted to allow limited delegation to the Commanders of the regional Theater Special Operations Commands and other senior military officials. This would ensure rapid deployment of funds and empower creative problem-solving for issues that do not rise to the level of SECDEF consideration. The restrictive legal prohibitions against covert action should be reinterpreted under a broader framework of contingency operations to enhance USSOF’s engagement capabilities. Finally, the 15-day congressional notification requirement should be reduced to 48-72 hours to prevent compromising operational security and ensure timely execution of time-sensitive missions.
While there are many positive elements of the SSCI process, current timelines fail to meet the demands of dynamic operational environments where timely support delivery can determine mission success. A streamlined process could feature a quarterly review committee led by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. This committee could include representatives from DSCA, the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnership, and Theater Special Operations Commands, enabling rapid review and approval of proposals involving smaller dollar amounts and context-specific needs. A system rewarding the best ideas with faster approval and funding would ensure that the most effective strategies rise to the top.
This new “middle ground” authority should also capitalize on cost efficiencies tailored to resistance-focused security cooperation, such as leveraging excess defense articles or small-scale, targeted training and equipment. Unlike traditional security cooperation programs, which feature large or complex weapons systems, resistance activities focus on empowering small partner units with discrete solutions. The review process should reflect this scope, balancing oversight with flexibility. Ensuring that US government-provided equipment is properly used, known as end-use monitoring, is mandated by Congress. This authority should require that new programs dedicate 5% of total value to independent third-party monitoring, which could improve compliance and enhance accountability without stifling innovation.
Oversight of USSOF’s resistance programs must also evolve to account for the unconventional nature of these operations. Traditional success metrics—often centered on observable outcomes—overlook the value of preventative actions, such as deterring hostile advances. Resistance operations may achieve their greatest success through non-events, which require alternative criteria for evaluation. A new mechanism attuned to these nuances could better capture the strategic value of USSOF’s preventive and innovative efforts. Such a mechanism would provide accountability while granting USSOF the necessary latitude to pursue strategies that anticipate and mitigate emerging threats.
Conclusion
The gray zone has become a pivotal battlefield in an international security environment marked by great power competition. As such, US capacity to support allies and partners through USSOF—in Ukraine and elsewhere—has become integral to our ability to compete strategically. However, current security cooperation mechanisms—such as section 127d and the SSCI process—are ill-equipped to meet USSOF’s needs. A new authority could address critical deficiencies in both mechanisms and forge a much-needed middle ground by improving components such as the appropriate funding cap, deployment speed, and oversight. These legislative adjustments will ensure that USSOF remains agile, innovative, and strategically impactful in supporting partner resistance and advancing US strategic objectives.
Author Bios
Jacob Zack is a Senior Technical Specialist at 413, LLC, where he crafts tailored products for policymakers. Jacob has led research and analysis for clients across the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the US Institute of Peace.
Adam Foote is the Director of Operations at 413, LLC. Adam began his work in IW during his active-duty time with 5th SFG and continued his engagement as a program manager for counterterrorism assistance at the Department of State and as a consultant supporting DoD’s security cooperation enterprise.
Image Credit: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Public Domain.
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government. If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.
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