“Our control of the skies guarantees us victory more than any other factor,” asserted David Ben Gurion in 1953, following a review of Israel’s armed forces. The June 2025 Israel-Iran War seems only to have reaffirmed Ben Gurion’s analysis. Less than 48 hours after the war’s outbreak, Israel achieved air superiority 1,500 kilometers away over the skies of Tehran. More than half of Iran’s missile launchers were allegedly destroyed, and over 20 senior officials eliminated, including Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders, military chiefs of staff, and nuclear scientists. With these successes, inevitable discussions of regime change have returned.
As the conflict progressed, President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu shifted from pushing for a deal to presenting a seemingly united front seeking a “total and complete victory” that discounted a ceasefire. Whether this rhetoric was psychological warfare designed to pressure Khamenei into surrendering, rather than mere strategic ambivalence, remains to be seen. The ambiguity even extended to the issue of leadership liquidation: Trump repeatedly hinted at Khamenei’s potential assassination. While Trump may have deemed the eradication of the nuclear threat an absolute win, the Netanyahu administration vacillated between strictly limiting its war aims to the incapacitation of the nuclear and ballistic-missile programs and encompassing full regime collapse within its definition of victory.
Ultimately, the war ended after 12 days with a precarious ceasefire. Both sides declared victory. Israel claimed it prevailed due to its significant degradation of Iran’s missile and nuclear programs following the U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites in Fordo, Isfahan, and Natanz. However, the ceasefire had become necessary: the Israeli economy could not afford to hemorrhage almost a billion dollars a day on war expenditures or sustain prolonged closed airspace. Advanced defensive interceptors were also running low. As for the Islamic Republic, it appears to have been disgraced by its lackluster defense—it needed to regain control of its skies and halt the pummeling of its strategic sites and military assets.
The aftermath of the conflict leaves a crucial strategic question in the balance: should the U.S. and Israel pursue regime change in Iran?The following analysis argues that effecting regime change would be a mistake. Not only does foreign-imposed regime change fail in the long term, but the act of leadership decapitation alone would breed chaos. In a televised speech on August 12, Netanyahu urged the Iranian people to “take to the streets;” however, the historical scars from the foreign-imposed regime change of 1953, the fragmented Iranian opposition landscape, and the nationalist Shi’i context all preclude successful regime change. The United States and Israel must balance military effectiveness with restraint to avoid repeating past mistakes.
The Symbolism of Ayatollah Khamenei’s Removal
As Prime Minister Ben Gurion was evaluating Israel’s security posture in 1953, Iran was grappling with the aftermath of a joint U.S.-U.K. coup that overthrew the democratically elected Prime Minister Mossadegh and restored the Pahlavi dynasty. The Shah, Mohammad Reza, was regarded by many Iranians as a foreign-imposed ruler. Coupled with his repressive reign, his illegitimacy contributed to his ouster with the advent of Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. More than 70 years later, the 1953 coup remains an indelible mark on modern Iran’s national consciousness. The United States and its allies’ present national-security challenges cannot be divorced from this initial strategic blunder that laid the foundation for the widespread anti-American sentiment pervading the regime’s base.
Beyond providing a symbolic win, the death of Ayatollah Khamenei would not ultimately alter the essence of the Iranian regime—Khamenei has already made a short list of potential successors to replace him as Guardian Jurist (vali-ye faqih) and to fill IRGC command roles. Worse, it could destabilize or incite the Shi’i world, both within and beyond Iran. If the Supreme Leader were to die as a result of Israeli or U.S. efforts, even segments of the ummah less sympathetic to the Shi’i regime may perceive this as an affront to the Muslim community as a whole.
Policymakers must account for current global dynamics. In light of the West’s legacy in the Middle East, and the backdrop of post-colonialism and anti-imperialism in social media, neither Israel nor the United States can afford to assassinate Khamenei. Considering the core Shi’i themes of martyrdom, oppression, and subjugation resonate with today’s younger generations, such a strike could incite popular resistance (al-muqawama). Regime-aligned entities could also opportunistically draw a comparison between Khamenei and Imam Hussein, equating the leader’s decapitation to a second Battle of Karbala—thereby galvanizing broad anti-Israeli and/or anti-U.S. sentiment that ends up bolstering the Islamic regime and backfiring in the long run.
To add insult to injury, many analysts have speculated that Khamenei has groomed his son Mojtaba to succeed him as Supreme Leader. Close to the IRGC and its Basij paramilitary force, he is regarded as a gatekeeper for those seeking access to his father. Even if reports that he was excluded from the short list of successors prove true, he could still inherit a great deal of political authority and prestige. By publicly exploiting his father’s martyrdom via expressions of grief and a desire for revenge, he could attempt to unite various sections of the population through Islamic and nationalist calls for resistance. If couched in the correct Shi’i vocabulary, it may even induce hesitant factions to double down in support of the regime.
Domestic Dynamics Not Conducive to Change
If enduring regime change is to occur in Iran, it must come from within. But have the Iranian people reached a breaking point? Recent reports do not instill confidence. While younger and secular demographics may have celebrated Israeli strikes on strategic sites throughout the country, this intellectual or emotional support does not immediately translate into revolutionary potential. True regime change requires a significant, organized opposition movement that has the capacity to take up arms and shed blood if necessary.
The opposition landscape remains fractured along ethnic and ideological lines. None of the leading alternatives have gained enough currency. The main opposition coalition, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), resides in exile in Paris. Maryam Rajavi, its President-elect, has never served in an official governmental capacity. Even if it were recognized by the international community at large, the NCRI would struggle to acquire legitimacy on Iranian soil among a heterogeneous population that has suffered forty years of repression. A second option that gained traction during round one of the Israel-Iran War was the reinstatement of the monarchy under Crown Prince Reza Shah, who has spent most of his life in exile. However, aversion to the Islamic Republic does not translate to desire for monarchy—many Iranians still oppose the revival of the despised Pahlavi dynasty.
U.S. and Israeli policymakers should heed a key lesson from modern Middle Eastern history: experienced regime insiders are critical to a successful transition. The painful legacy of de-Ba’athification in Iraq is a reminder that former IRGC officials will need to facilitate the changeover. In light of the IRGC’s deep entrenchment in the Islamic Republic’s political, economic, and security apparatus, the best chance at regime change will likely be an insider coup involving IRGC elements. Ultimately, the Iranian people are highly nationalistic—a lack of interference by foreign governments or exiles will be most conducive to a successful revolution.
Strategic Approaches Should “Round Two” Ignite
A second round of the Israel-Iran War is likely imminent if the Iranian regime opts for face-saving measures to reassert authority amid mounting pressure. Whereas some Israeli military analysts speculate that it could break out in 2–3 years, others believe it could erupt in a matter of months or even weeks. Notably, the decision to activate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism on August 28 provides a 30-day window for Iran to comply with the nuclear deal or face the reimposition of United Nations sanctions. With key JCPOA provisions set to expire on October 18, round two of the war could occur as soon as this fall. Regardless of the actual time frame, it is crucial for the U.S. and Israel to determine their respective strategic goals—and limitations—prior to the renewal of conflict.
Although remarkable in its efficacy, the Israeli Air Force cannot achieve anything beyond severely degrading the Islamic Republic’s nuclear and missile projects. Even if its bombing campaign were to blanket Tehran, the state apparatus would fail to disintegrate. As Mearsheimer warns in his seminal book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, air power alone does not suffice. While a critical component, it cannot compensate for a lack of ground presence, especially when nations do not share borders. Despite geographical realities, air power may be sufficient if the Trump and Netanyahu administrations can claim military victory after the re-degradation of the nuclear facilities and missile-launcher arsenal.
Aligning air campaigns with strategic aims would require a fundamental shift. Regardless of the objectives, economic targets should be spared. The Islamic Republic’s modus operandi is to externalize any blame for its own governance failures—if gas and oil infrastructure were to be hit again, the regime could use the strikes as a rallying point against the U.S.-Israeli alliance. The Iranian population has been grappling with drastic energy shortages and a dire economic situation for years. Rather than directing public ire towards the regime, such strikes could be portrayed as attacks on already suffering civilians. Like economic warfare, financial warfare can be particularly effective when carried out with surgical precision. In the case of Iran, U.S. and Israeli analysts should sustain their gray-zone campaign against the para-governmental foundations (bonyads) and hawala informal financial networks that support the merchant class and IRGC.
Psychological operations (PSYOP) must underpin any renewed hostilities. Khamenei built the system on unquestioned loyalty to the Islamic Republic—the depth of Mossad penetration at the regime’s highest levels underscores how leadership decapitation threats can be leveraged by Israel and the U.S. to exacerbate the Guardian Jurist’s desperation and further cloud his strategic calculus. The lack of clarity vis-à-vis an assassination attempt on Khamenei or foreign-backed coup is also compounded by IDF posts insinuating treason. For example, during round one, the IDF’s Farsi-language X account posted that “members of the regime’s security institutions” had been contacting it; it denied being the “appropriate authority” and instead referred them to the Mossad’s website. This tongue-in-cheek approach helped plant additional seeds of doubt both within the population and the regime’s ranks at an inflection point in the campaign. As reports of a gathering opposition within Iran emerge, the U.S.-Israel alliance should give the Islamic Republic a taste of its own PSYOP medicine. Nevertheless, it is important not to overly humiliate the regime to avoid triggering nationalistic pride.
Besides leveraging psychological warfare, the U.S. and Israel should continue to inhibit the reconstitution of Iran’s proxy network. This will help minimize Israel’s attack surface by curtailing the number of active arenas during round two. Moreover, a defanged proxy network will thwart the Islamic Republic’s overall Unity of Fronts campaign and mitigate the long-term strategic threats to the Western alliance in the region.
The Islamic Republic is its own worst enemy. Both literally and proverbially, it consistently prioritizes war over water. Rather than addressing domestic issues, it has invested in its regional proxies and partners by banking on the strength of its security forces and the sanctity of its Islamic essence. For decades, it has neglected public infrastructure and segments outside of regime strongholds. If a drought could trigger the 2011 Syrian Civil War, a similar turn of events in an oppressive, drought-stricken Iran is not hard to envision.
Conclusion
The history of the modern Middle East teaches that externally imposed regime change is neither effective, legitimate, nor sustainable. For decades, the U.S. and its allies have operated in the Middle East without sufficiently anticipating the second- and third-order consequences of their foreign policy. When tackling a regime such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is vital to factor in the context of Ayatollah Khamenei’s role as Supreme Leader and Guardian Jurist. The regime’s infrastructure, coupled with the weakness of the existing opposition and Khamenei’s appointment of successors, poises the current regime for resilience. Moreover, popular chaos throughout the Shi’i Crescent would also ensue from the ayatollah’s martyrdom. The U.S. and Israel should maintain a narrow strategic scope should the Israel-Iran War reignite. Like in round one, they ought to set back the nuclear and missile threats while crippling the regime to the extent possible short of eliminating Khamenei. Instead, he should be left in power with a gutted economy, a water and energy crisis, and a depleted inner circle following the decimation of the upper echelons. When paired with such a visible defeat, a loss of domestic standing should enable a viable opposition movement to organize itself organically over the coming months. Rather than in an Israeli or U.S. assassination, Khamenei’s true end lies in the hands of the Iranian public.
Alexandra Veyne is the Chief Human Resources Officer of IWI. She holds an A.B. in Near Eastern Studies with High Honors from Princeton University, where she studied the languages and cultures of the Middle East with an eye toward policy. Her professional background includes working as a writer and editor for cybersecurity companies.
Main Image: The 1979 Islamic Revolution. Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
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